From Chat Rooms to Public Squares: Social Media, Cognitive Warfare, and OSCE Standards

From chat to street What October’s protests mean for Ticino: social networks, cognitive warfare and OSCE standards Ticinus — Centro Studi, executive report, Locarno, October 2026. Summary of the complementary report «Dalla chat alla piazza: media sociali, guerra cognitiva e standard OSCE» (From chat to street: social media, cognitive warfare and OSCE standards), dated 25 October 2026. Data, quotations and sources are documented in the full report, available in Italian. The Italian investigations are ongoing, and the presumption of innocence applies to the persons mentioned. Summary In Italy, the October protests were called by an anonymous network: some forty groups, 19 Telegram chats, 9,010 users as of 19 October and six administrators using pseudonyms, with TikTok as the «engine». The alleged originator placed under investigation on 24 October relates to the second phase of the protests, not to the initial spark. In France, within a single week, digital tools became a complete infrastructure, with more than 660 events mapped, legal advice, offline communication and even a counter-mobilisation in 66 cities. Evidence of foreign orchestration remains insufficient, according to Euronews Russia-linked networks exploited the violence to amplify their own disinformation campaigns. The danger is not an app as such: it is the combination of genuine hardship, algorithms that reward violent images and actors able to exploit them. For the youth strike in Bellinzona on 20 November and the OSCE Ministerial Council in Lugano on 3–4 December, the OSCE/ODIHR–Venice Commission Guidelines offer a concrete yardstick: individual liability, no blanket bans, visibility of protest, protection of journalists and monitors. In Switzerland, online monitoring already has a legal basis; rather than new powers, what is needed is transparent rules, as ODIHR also recommends in its October 2026 report. Why this report On 17 October and the following days, protests against the rising cost of living reached Milan, Turin, Bologna, Paris, Marseille and other cities close to Ticino, the Italian-speaking canton of Switzerland, with episodes of violence and looting. Two dates are approaching in Ticino: the youth strike of 20 November in Bellinzona, part of a campaign across ten countries, and the OSCE Ministerial Council of 3–4 December in Lugano, under the Swiss Chairpersonship. The report reconstructs how the network called people onto the streets, reads these events through the theory of cognitive warfare and compares them with international standards on freedom of assembly. The spark and the network According to a preliminary analysis by the IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca, the «Italia in piazza» network started on WhatsApp, moved to Telegram and branched out into some forty groups sharing the same emblem; Instagram was merely «cover». Alongside it, a bait chat appeared, inviting teenagers to Milan’s cathedral square with the promise of hoodies and trainers from looted shops, and then disappeared. Italian authorities speak of «hybrid warfare», but admit they have no clear evidence of orchestration; according to Euronews there is no conclusive proof of a foreign trigger. In France, the date of 17 October originated in a TikTok video by an unknown young man. For the «Act II» of 24 October, digital tools organised maps, regional channels, legal assistance and Bluetooth communication, while groups of volunteers offered to «defend» shops, raising the risk of vigilante justice. Cognitive warfare For the political scientist Asma Mhalla, cognitive warfare does not invent discontent: it amplifies it, working over the long term through saturation of attention and the «double bind», in which every reaction risks legitimising what one seeks to counter. The dilemma for the state is real: attributing everything to foreign orchestration delegitimises genuine hardship, while ignoring external amplification leaves the field open to those who practise it. Ticino, too, shows on a small scale the merging of press and social media: an unverified post that makes its way into a newspaper, and a reply that goes back online. The remedy is to restore each sphere’s own rules: verification and accountability for the press, restraint for those in politics. OSCE standards put to the test The Guidelines of ODIHR and the Venice Commission (3rd edition, 2019) are not binding in themselves, but they reflect the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. In 2026 Switzerland chairs the OSCE, which brings together 57 states including the United States and Russia, and has made human rights one of its priorities: in Lugano it will also be judged on how it applies the standards it promotes. For 20 November, three points stand out. The Swiss authorisation regime is compatible with the Guidelines if permits are granted as a rule and conditions concern time, place and manner, not the message (§ 115). Organisers are not liable for damage caused by others, unless they personally incited it (§§ 37 and 224): this point is missing from the debate in Ticino. Nor may organisers be required to pay for policing or for paid stewarding (§§ 89 and 156–157), which is precisely one of the issues in the appeal against Ticino’s new police law. For Lugano, other aspects matter. A general ban with exceptions, such as the one adopted in Geneva for the G7 summit in Evian, is the pattern the Guidelines regard as disproportionate, and security zones must be justified case by case (§§ 133, 147 and 151). Protesters should be offered a location within sight and sound of their audience (§§ 22 and 82). Border checks are permissible only if based on evidence of imminent violence and without discrimination (§§ 177–178). Kettling must remain exceptional and brief, with water and toilets, and must not be used to gather data; water cannon must never be used at temperatures below zero (§§ 217 and 182), a concrete issue in December. Mass arrests must be avoided even when resources are lacking (§ 218), and journalists and monitors must be able to document events even during a dispersal, while access to the internet and social media must not be blocked (§§ 70 and 197–210). On face coverings, the Guidelines rule out bans without evidence of imminent violence (§ 153), whereas the federal law in force since 2025 requires prior authorisation, except for people protecting themselves from the cold or for safety reasons. This gap will need to be managed both on 20 November and in Lugano. The network under watch Swiss police forces cannot block platforms or chats, but they can monitor them. The Federal Intelligence Service monitors public websites and forums; according to the Federal Supreme Court, internet searches are permissible, whereas access to closed groups requires the approval of a judge. In Ticino, the police law already allows preventive observation and undercover investigations, the latter authorised by a judge; the new law, in force from 2027 and challenged before the Federal Supreme Court, also provides for drones and biometric tools. Ticino’s data protection law prohibits profiling people for the lawful exercise of their rights. The Liberal Radical Party (PLR) is calling, among other things, for police custody to be extended from 24 to 48 hours and for closer surveillance of violent extremists. These measures are compatible with the standards as long as they remain individual; the 24-hour limit, however, is set by the federal Criminal Procedure Code (Art. 219(4) CrimPC), and the canton cannot change it on its own. On charging costs, the Federal Supreme Court has accepted in principle that organisers may be held liable, within the limits of proportionality (BGE 143 I 147). ODIHR’s October 2026 report on the surveillance of peaceful assemblies recommends transparency across the entire surveillance lifecycle, independent oversight and evidenced justifications whenever security is invoked. The backdrop: rising prices and rearmament An addendum rereads Bertrand Russell, José Ortega y Gasset and Oswald Spengler in the light of digital networks: impulse prevailing over reason, direct action without intermediaries, public truth as a product of repetition. Ortega and Spengler offer a diagnosis; Russell offers a remedy: education in doubt. War is the backdrop. Defence spending by the 27 EU member states rose from 218 billion euros in 2021 to 418 billion in 2025; in Germany, a military service questionnaire for 18-year-olds is back; in Switzerland, the 2027 relief package mainly serves to finance the army and the old-age pension system (AHV/AVS), while Parliament is debating a temporary VAT increase for armament. The slogan of the 20 November strike is «Fight for our future, not for their wars». What this means for Ticino Canton The report does not put forward partisan proposals, but identifies some conditions for effective prevention. For 20 November, timely dialogue with the organisers, who are identifiable, and a guarantee for the authorised march, without asking them to answer for others. For Lugano, measures limited in time and space, a protest site within sight and sound, and an invitation to independent monitors. Online, monitoring limited to violent groups, with a judge for closed spaces and a public report once the summit is over. Finally, investing in civic and media education at least as much as in security arrangements. The best prevention lies in clear rules decided in good time and in respect for the standards that Switzerland, this year, is called upon to promote. Niccolò Salvioni, political and institutional analyst, Ticinus — Centro Studi, Locarno

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