Who owns the public treasury?

Who Owns the Public Treasury? Executive Summary of the Report “Historical, Comparative, and Philosophical Analysis: Is a Public Office as a Source of Income a Sign of Decline?” and the “Operational Proposals” The Starting Point In the fall of 2026, the publication of the compensation for the board of directors of the canton’s leading municipal enterprise reignited the debate on public office positions. The report does not focus on individuals, but rather on positions, types, and trends, and poses an age-old question: Who owns the public coffers, and who lives off them? The Thesis The tendency to maximize income from public office does not yet constitute a decline of Ticino’s and Switzerland’s institutions, but it is an early sign of such a decline, in Machiavelli’s sense: it signals that the criterion for selection is shifting from function to benefit. Institutions do not collapse when an abuse first arises, but when the abuse becomes the norm and the forms continue to mask a changed substance. What Emerges 1. Forms change; oversight recedes. Public enterprises become corporations and autonomous entities, which in turn create subsidiaries. Decisions and compensation fall outside the approved budget and the financial referendum. 2. Compensation remains opaque. As a rule, at most the total amount paid to the board is known, not how much each director receives across the entire group. 3. Seats follow party quotas. The report identifies eight types in Ticino: from the municipal administrator to the end-of-career landing spot, up to the mayor and the “service administrator,” who manages the local government and risks burnout. 4. The cycle of positions and votes. Positions generate support, and support generates positions: the system of patronage feeds on itself, rewards those already in office, and makes any reform more difficult. 5. No rules after the term ends. In Ticino, a State Councilor may not, during their term, serve—even without compensation—on the governing bodies of a for-profit company; the day after their term ends, there is no cooling-off period. At the federal level, the cooling-off period for civil servants is merely optional; for Federal Councilors, it does not exist. 6. The third branch of government. In Ticino, the State Council authorizes judges to serve as arbitrators, without public disclosure or rules on compensation. 7. An outside perspective. GRECO criticizes Switzerland for relying on self-regulation. On Transparency International’s index, Switzerland ranks sixth but has lost six points in ten years. Italy presents the opposite picture: many rules, but only partial results. 8. The Militia Under Pressure. Municipal executives are performing work that is increasingly close to full-time, yet their honoraria are designed for part-time work. Income thus shifts to secondary positions, and the municipal secretary—the primary guardian of legality—has no legal mandate for ensuring compliance with the law enshrined in statute. Key Proposals The report is accompanied by 23 operational proposals, organized into six principles. Among the key ones: • Transfer of compensation: Compensation received by municipal representatives in various bodies should be remitted to the municipality, as has been the case in Locarno since 2010. • Transparency: Annual publication of compensation per person, extended to the entire group and its subsidiaries. • Appointments based on merit: Published job profiles, open applications, consultation with independent experts, limits on holding multiple positions and term limits, and separation between party leadership and appointments. • Post-office: a 12-month waiting period (18 months for State Councilors), with a transitional allowance and a public opinion from an independent body. • Groups and competition: legislative approval required for new subsidiaries, an annual report on equity holdings, and competitive neutrality. • Oversight: a cantonal Integrity Authority, with sanctions and an anti-corruption strategy for the canton and municipalities. • Local government: mayors’ honoraria based on actual workload and a new statute for the municipal secretary. • Justice and the Confederation: authorization for arbitration by the Judicial Council and a cantonal initiative directed at Bern. The Timeline Immediately, municipalities can publish compensation figures and adopt regulations on the transfer of funds. Within one year, the Municipal Organic Law, the Grand Council Law, and the Judicial Organization Law must be amended. Within two years, a cantonal law on the integrity of public office and the cantonal initiative must be adopted. The militia system does not end when work is paid for; it ends when work is paid for secretly.

ITEN