Has Switzerland Taken Off Its Mask? Notes on the Language of Neutrality, from 1939 to the Present

Has Switzerland Taken Off Its Mask? Notes on the Language of Neutrality, from 1939 to the Present In September 1939, on the eve of the war, the Federal Council issued its Declaration of Neutrality. The language speaks louder than many commentaries: no aggressor named, no belligerent mentioned, only an “international tension” without a subject. Neutrality is founded on the treaties of 1815, which recognize it as “corresponding to the true interests of the politics of all of Europe”—a role that Europe had assigned to Switzerland, standing above the parties. And the apparatus that supported it—the ordinance on the maintenance of neutrality of April 14, 1939, and a war economy already in place since December 1938—had been built months in advance and triggered at precisely the right moment. Not a reaction: a mechanism. I contrast these documents with the interview of the head of the Military Intelligence Service, Brigadier Stefano Trojani, who referred to the Russian government as a “regime.” Technically speaking, the term is defensible. But “regime” has a second, connotative meaning: it is reserved for those one wishes to identify as adversaries, never for partners or allies with similar traits. No Swiss official would say “the Saudi regime” or “the Egyptian regime.” The choice does not follow a coherent political science framework: it follows the prevailing political alignment of the moment. And in the broadcast report, the visual framing—the American aircraft carrier, “American military assets,” “the Western arms industry”—places Switzerland within a camp, not above the camps. Here, the correct standard of judgment is not state neutrality—which does not apply to RSI—but the requirement of relevance under Art. 4(2) of the Radio and Television Act (LRTV): opinions and comments must be recognizable as such. Much of what was broadcast is legitimate: the statement comes from an interviewee, and the Federal Supreme Court acknowledges that individual positions may be one-sided (DTF 139 II 519, which arose precisely from an examination of coverage of a referendum). But two points stand out: a characterization as a “regime” that appeared in the news broadcast without any indication that it was a value judgment; and, above all, the body of broadcasts (Art. 4, para. 4)—Süssli, Roos, Trojani, the coverage of the Baud case—which all follow the same tone, in the run-up to a vote on the issue. This is not an isolated incident: it is a trend that spans the change in leadership. The question, just a few days before the September 27 vote on the neutrality initiative, is not whether the right word was used. It is whether Switzerland still perceives its neutrality as an existential condition—or as a label to be handled casually, because we no longer feel the danger—or even—as it was in 1939.

ITEN