Why “Moscow’s Target”: A Legal and Institutional Analysis

Army Chief Benedikt Roos has described Switzerland as a “target for Moscow” because it is part of the Western world. This report turns that perspective on its head: the problem is not Russian hostility in and of itself, but the fact that Switzerland no longer enjoys the protection that stemmed from its status as a neutral power. The right to neutrality, codified in the Fifth Hague Convention of 1907, rests on two obligations: not to supply war material to the belligerents (Art. 7) and to treat them impartially (Art. 9). In recent years, a series of decisions has substantially eroded that balance: the presence of Swiss-made weapons systems destined for Ukraine via indirect channels, the opening of exports to 25 countries—almost all of them Western (a legislative amendment from December 2025, suspended by a successful referendum), joining NATO’s ammunition program, the facilitation of military transit provided for in the 2026 Security Strategy, and the alignment of sanctions with those of the EU against Russia alone—for the first time against a nuclear power holding a veto right at the UN. From a formal standpoint, the Federal Council’s position is defensible: the Hague obligations apply to state-sponsored supplies, not to the private trade in military equipment, which neutrality law does not require to be prohibited. From a formal standpoint, the Federal Council’s position is defensible: the Hague obligations apply to state-sponsored supplies, not to the private trade in military equipment, which neutrality law does not require to be prohibited. The report, however, highlights the limitation of this approach: equal treatment is not measured by individual provisions, but rather by the overall effect of a system that systematically favors only one side. The report, however, highlights the limitation of this approach: equal treatment is not measured by individual provisions, but rather by the overall effect of a system that systematically favors only one side. The report acknowledges this argument but highlights its limitation: equal treatment is not measured by individual provisions, but by the overall effect of a system that systematically favors a single sector. Permanent neutrality is not a catalog of technical prohibitions, but a credible neutral stance; and it is that stance—not the letter of the articles—that provides protection. This forms the basis for the report’s response to two opposing arguments. To those who argue, along with Professor Odile Ammann, that credible neutrality serves “the common interest” and entails sanctions, the report counters that a neutrality that consistently sides with the same party is no longer equidistance but selective judgment, coinciding with that of the EU. To those who point out, along with historian Thomas Maissen, that it was not neutrality that saved us in 1939–45, the report responds that that very episode proves the point: Switzerland was spared purely out of self-interest—occupying it would have cost more than it would have yielded, with the Ridotto threatening the Alpine lines vital to the Axis. It is this very calculation that today’s alignment risks overturning: siding with one camp increases one’s value as a target without offering any protection in return, especially since an attack on a non-NATO country does not trigger Article 5 and does not oblige anyone to respond. The conclusion is that the danger Roos evokes is largely self-inflicted by a political choice: made by the Federal Council, ratified by Parliament, and, on September 27, put to the people via the neutrality initiative. If the initiative fails, responsibility for this drift will also fall on the citizens—the very same people who, according to Roos, do not perceive the danger, because they are still convinced they are protected.

ITEN