Switzerland–EU Bilateral Agreements III: Institutional Challenges for Swiss Democracy
Premise and historical context On 23 November 2025, at the Casa del Popolo in Bellinzona, Niccolò Salvioni delivered the opening address at the conference «Switzerland-EU agreements: what dangers for democracy, labour and public service?», organised by the cross-party committee «No EU No NATO». It was followed by talks from Graziano Pestoni (crisis of the European neoliberal model and the public energy service), Leonardo Schmid (labour market and the status of cross-border workers) and Alberto Togni (sovereignty and defence). That date falls at a precise point in the Bilaterals III timeline: the federal consultation, launched by the Federal Council in June 2025, had just closed (end of October 2025), while the signing of the agreements in Brussels was still to come. Since then, the picture has moved on three fronts: 2 March 2026 — Swiss Confederation President Guy Parmelin and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen sign the package of agreements, protocols and the joint declaration on the high-level dialogue in Brussels (the agreement on EU programmes had already been signed in November 2025) (EDA; RSI). 13 March 2026 — the Federal Council adopts the dispatch to Parliament; the parliamentary phase opens and is still under way between the National Council and the Council of States (EDA). 12 August 2026 — one day before this summary, the Federal Council rejects the parliamentary initiative of the Council of States' Political Institutions Committee (PIC-S), which had called for a constitutional amendment to subject Bilaterals III to a mandatory referendum. The Government confirms its position of 30 April 2025 in favour of an optional referendum (EDA). A popular vote nonetheless remains likely, tentatively in 2027 or 2028. The mandatory-referendum question — that is, the demand for a double majority (of the people and of the cantons) rather than a mere optional referendum — was already at the centre of the Bellinzona address, and it remains today the one point in the timeline where the Federal Council's position and that of ten cantons, Ticino among them, are still in direct conflict. What follows is a summary of that address's content, with the data and arguments as presented on 23 November 2025 — to be read bearing in mind that the package is now signed and under debate in Parliament, no longer merely a negotiating hypothesis. The facts: figures and regulatory impact Switzerland–EU relations currently rest on around 120 agreements, chiefly Bilaterals I (1999) and II (2004, Schengen/Dublin), locked in "static" mode: any change requires unanimity and lengthy negotiations. Bilaterals III introduce 9 main instruments — institutional updates (free movement, transport, MRA, agriculture), new agreements (energy, food safety, health) and cooperation schemes (EU programmes, space agency) — and shift to dynamic incorporation of EU law. EU regulations involved: 150-200 main acts, up to 350 including delegated ones, totalling 1,800-2,000 pages — 1-1.5% of the acquis communautaire (170,000-180,000 pages, 23,000-25,000 acts). Swiss legislation involved: 80-100 federal laws out of 600-650 (12-16%) and 200-250 federal ordinances out of about 2,000; an estimated 6,000-7,000 pages of federal legislation, roughly 20% of the total corpus. Cantonal and municipal level: 30-50 laws per canton (14-18% in Ticino); 15-25 municipal regulations (18-25%), with a disproportionate impact on border municipalities such as Chiasso, Mendrisio and Lugano and on medium-to-large towns such as Bellinzona and Locarno. Economic impact: a hypothesised 40% of federal GDP (energy, transport, labour market, food safety, research) and 60% of Ticino's GDP, given the canton's high cross-border integration and its 80,000 cross-border workers (about 20% of the national total, over 35% of the cantonal workforce). The address notes in its appendix that these percentages are reconstructive estimates, not confirmed official figures. Direct financial costs: over CHF 2 billion (CHF 2,005.08 million) for EU cohesion over 2030-2036, plus a further CHF 1,013.7 million in supplementary financial commitments, on top of annual contributions to Horizon Europe, Erasmus+ and the GNSS space programmes. Cantonal vote: 21 cantons in favour; Schwyz, Nidwalden, Schaffhausen and Ticino against (Obwalden abstaining). Ticino justified its opposing vote by pointing to reservations over the safeguard clause, the financial compensation mechanisms and the uncertainties surrounding the electricity agreement. Ten cantons, including Ticino, are calling for a mandatory referendum. The analysis Sovereignty traded away. The address compares the EU contributions (over CHF 2 billion) with the USD 200 billion (~CHF 176 billion) in investments agreed with the United States to avoid punitive tariffs. Since the EU absorbs 48-50% of Swiss exports against 16-18% for the US, applying the same ratio would require Switzerland to pay Brussels between CHF 540 and 600 billion. The much lower actual figure is read as evidence of an asymmetric exchange: paying less in financial terms, Switzerland accepts mandatory dynamic incorporation of EU law, constraints on cantonal state aid, and the loss of strategic energy competences, in sectors that account for 40% of federal GDP. Key institutional mechanisms. Mandatory (though not automatic) dynamic incorporation, with alignment required within two years and postponement possible only via referendum; decision shaping without voting rights; a Joint Committee deciding by consensus; a mixed arbitration tribunal bound by preliminary rulings from the EU Court of Justice (CJEU) on matters of EU law; compensatory measures with the possibility of cross-retaliation (retaliation even in sectors unrelated to the specific breach). Constitutional erosion. The address cites Prof. Glaser (legislative sovereignty becomes an economic cost rather than a real option) and Prof. Richli (a material amendment of Art. 3 of the Constitution on cantonal sovereignty, Art. 163 on the form of laws, Art. 189 on the role of the Federal Supreme Court, and Art. 34 on political rights). Comparison with other models. The European Economic Area (Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein) incorporates around 5,000 directives but with a right of consultation and permanent representation in Brussels. Post-Brexit United Kingdom has rejected both dynamic incorporation and CJEU jurisdiction, remaining outside the EU's mutual defence clause (Art. 42.7 TEU). Pre-accession states (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Serbia) harmonise progressively but know they will gain a decision-making voice once they join. Switzerland, according to the address, would under Bilaterals III reach a level of integration higher than post-Brexit Britain and comparable to that of pre-accession states, yet without voting rights under any scenario — described as an «organised anomaly» with no real international equivalent. The hermit crab and sea anemone metaphor. The address proposes the symbiosis between the hermit crab and the sea anemone as a reading of Switzerland's position: mutual protection as long as the waters stay calm, but the risk of being «dragged into the same currents» should the EU venture into sanctions, NATO-aligned positions or trade conflicts that Switzerland does not share. It recalls Hersch Lauterpacht's 1936 formula: «collective security and neutrality are mutually exclusive». Conclusion and proposal The address characterises the government's choice not to submit Bilaterals III to a mandatory referendum as a sign of a worrying disconnect between federal institutions and popular sovereignty — an argument taken up by the Lega and the SVP/UDC, and echoed in Ticino's opposing cantonal vote. The central proposal, back in November 2025, was unambiguous: only a mandatory referendum, requiring a vote of both the people and the cantons, can ensure that a change of this constitutional magnitude respects the federal will — invoking Switzerland as a «Willensnation» capable of continually regenerating consensus, rather than sliding into a mere «induced reactivity» to European rules. Nine months on, the Federal Council's decision of 12 August 2026 to reject the PIC-S initiative for a mandatory referendum settles this point, for now, against the line argued in Bellinzona: the Government maintains its proposal for an optional referendum, leaving Parliament to have the final say on the type of procedure (EDA fact sheet on legal aspects). The issue therefore remains openly political, and will carry over into the coming weeks of parliamentary debate and, in all likelihood, into the 2027-2028 referendum campaign. Original address: Niccolò Salvioni, «Bilaterali CH-UE III: le sfide istituzionali per la democrazia svizzera» (Bilaterals CH-EU III: the institutional challenges for Swiss democracy), Bellinzona, 23 November 2025.