Public Order
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8 November 2026
ITEN
Repeated Disturbance in a Public Place
Executive summary (English) In many Ticino municipalities, unease in public spaces stems not from serious crime but from a few individuals or small groups who accumulate minor incidents. Each incident alone is too minor for a firm yet proportionate response; together they make a neighbourhood hard to live in. The report finds a central gap: between the police exclusion order of up to 30 days under Ticino's new Police Act and the criminal-law area ban of Art. 67b of the Swiss Criminal Code, which requires an offence against specific persons, there is no medium-term instrument. Incidents are not added up, police and social services cannot share information, many offences prosecuted only upon complaint go unreported, and victims bear small damages alone. Experience in Zurich, Chur, Lausanne and Basel, and the reversal in Oregon, show that results come when enforcement and care go hand in hand. The report proposes graduated measures across three levels: targeted, time-limited municipal rules; a cantonal area ban of up to three months with mandatory support and judicial review; an inter-agency case conference with a clear legal basis for information sharing; a fund advancing compensation for minor damage; and federal amendments to Art. 67b of the Criminal Code.
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31 October 2026
ITEN
Camignolo: Political Criticism of Judicial Decisions
Camignolo: political criticism of judicial decisions On 30 October 2026 the Ticino Public Prosecutor's Office issued two penalty orders over the detention of a protester in Camignolo on 13 October 2025, during an evening event attended by Federal Councillor Ignazio Cassis. Within hours the political parties had taken positions. This analysis does not assess the facts. The orders are not final, the officers may file an objection, and they are fully presumed innocent. Instead, it examines how politics in Ticino and in Italy reacts to judicial decisions that concern the police. From the standards of the Consultative Council of European Judges, the analysis derives six criteria for distinguishing legitimate criticism from undue pressure on the judiciary. They are the target, the timing, the channel, the accuracy of the facts, the legislative follow-up and the position of the speaker. It applies them with the same yardstick to the reactions of the Ticino parties, the Cantonal Government and the Italian Government in the Crans-Montana and Siher cases. It then shows that the same police intervention may fall under different legal regimes. In an ordinary setting, cantonal law applies. When officers protect persons on behalf of the Confederation, federal law comes into play, and its rules on the use of coercion remain a grey area for cantonal police forces. The yardstick for the protests of 20 November in Bellinzona will therefore not be the same as for the OSCE Ministerial Council in Lugano on 3 and 4 December. The analysis concludes that the constructive path runs through rules, both cantonal and federal, not through verdicts delivered before the trial. The parties, to which the Federal Constitution entrusts the task of shaping public opinion, bear a particular responsibility in this. The text is a preview of the study "Impartiality and the Police under Investigation" (in Italian), which Ticinus will publish after the OSCE meeting.
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25 October 2026
ITEN
From Chat Rooms to Public Squares: Social Media, Cognitive Warfare, and OSCE Standards
From chat to street What October’s protests mean for Ticino: social networks, cognitive warfare and OSCE standards Ticinus — Centro Studi, executive report, Locarno, October 2026. Summary of the complementary report «Dalla chat alla piazza: media sociali, guerra cognitiva e standard OSCE» (From chat to street: social media, cognitive warfare and OSCE standards), dated 25 October 2026. Data, quotations and sources are documented in the full report, available in Italian. The Italian investigations are ongoing, and the presumption of innocence applies to the persons mentioned. Summary In Italy, the October protests were called by an anonymous network: some forty groups, 19 Telegram chats, 9,010 users as of 19 October and six administrators using pseudonyms, with TikTok as the «engine». The alleged originator placed under investigation on 24 October relates to the second phase of the protests, not to the initial spark. In France, within a single week, digital tools became a complete infrastructure, with more than 660 events mapped, legal advice, offline communication and even a counter-mobilisation in 66 cities. Evidence of foreign orchestration remains insufficient, according to Euronews Russia-linked networks exploited the violence to amplify their own disinformation campaigns. The danger is not an app as such: it is the combination of genuine hardship, algorithms that reward violent images and actors able to exploit them. For the youth strike in Bellinzona on 20 November and the OSCE Ministerial Council in Lugano on 3–4 December, the OSCE/ODIHR–Venice Commission Guidelines offer a concrete yardstick: individual liability, no blanket bans, visibility of protest, protection of journalists and monitors. In Switzerland, online monitoring already has a legal basis; rather than new powers, what is needed is transparent rules, as ODIHR also recommends in its October 2026 report. Why this report On 17 October and the following days, protests against the rising cost of living reached Milan, Turin, Bologna, Paris, Marseille and other cities close to Ticino, the Italian-speaking canton of Switzerland, with episodes of violence and looting. Two dates are approaching in Ticino: the youth strike of 20 November in Bellinzona, part of a campaign across ten countries, and the OSCE Ministerial Council of 3–4 December in Lugano, under the Swiss Chairpersonship. The report reconstructs how the network called people onto the streets, reads these events through the theory of cognitive warfare and compares them with international standards on freedom of assembly. The spark and the network According to a preliminary analysis by the IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca, the «Italia in piazza» network started on WhatsApp, moved to Telegram and branched out into some forty groups sharing the same emblem; Instagram was merely «cover». Alongside it, a bait chat appeared, inviting teenagers to Milan’s cathedral square with the promise of hoodies and trainers from looted shops, and then disappeared. Italian authorities speak of «hybrid warfare», but admit they have no clear evidence of orchestration; according to Euronews there is no conclusive proof of a foreign trigger. In France, the date of 17 October originated in a TikTok video by an unknown young man. For the «Act II» of 24 October, digital tools organised maps, regional channels, legal assistance and Bluetooth communication, while groups of volunteers offered to «defend» shops, raising the risk of vigilante justice. Cognitive warfare For the political scientist Asma Mhalla, cognitive warfare does not invent discontent: it amplifies it, working over the long term through saturation of attention and the «double bind», in which every reaction risks legitimising what one seeks to counter. The dilemma for the state is real: attributing everything to foreign orchestration delegitimises genuine hardship, while ignoring external amplification leaves the field open to those who practise it. Ticino, too, shows on a small scale the merging of press and social media: an unverified post that makes its way into a newspaper, and a reply that goes back online. The remedy is to restore each sphere’s own rules: verification and accountability for the press, restraint for those in politics. OSCE standards put to the test The Guidelines of ODIHR and the Venice Commission (3rd edition, 2019) are not binding in themselves, but they reflect the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. In 2026 Switzerland chairs the OSCE, which brings together 57 states including the United States and Russia, and has made human rights one of its priorities: in Lugano it will also be judged on how it applies the standards it promotes. For 20 November, three points stand out. The Swiss authorisation regime is compatible with the Guidelines if permits are granted as a rule and conditions concern time, place and manner, not the message (§ 115). Organisers are not liable for damage caused by others, unless they personally incited it (§§ 37 and 224): this point is missing from the debate in Ticino. Nor may organisers be required to pay for policing or for paid stewarding (§§ 89 and 156–157), which is precisely one of the issues in the appeal against Ticino’s new police law. For Lugano, other aspects matter. A general ban with exceptions, such as the one adopted in Geneva for the G7 summit in Evian, is the pattern the Guidelines regard as disproportionate, and security zones must be justified case by case (§§ 133, 147 and 151). Protesters should be offered a location within sight and sound of their audience (§§ 22 and 82). Border checks are permissible only if based on evidence of imminent violence and without discrimination (§§ 177–178). Kettling must remain exceptional and brief, with water and toilets, and must not be used to gather data; water cannon must never be used at temperatures below zero (§§ 217 and 182), a concrete issue in December. Mass arrests must be avoided even when resources are lacking (§ 218), and journalists and monitors must be able to document events even during a dispersal, while access to the internet and social media must not be blocked (§§ 70 and 197–210). On face coverings, the Guidelines rule out bans without evidence of imminent violence (§ 153), whereas the federal law in force since 2025 requires prior authorisation, except for people protecting themselves from the cold or for safety reasons. This gap will need to be managed both on 20 November and in Lugano. The network under watch Swiss police forces cannot block platforms or chats, but they can monitor them. The Federal Intelligence Service monitors public websites and forums; according to the Federal Supreme Court, internet searches are permissible, whereas access to closed groups requires the approval of a judge. In Ticino, the police law already allows preventive observation and undercover investigations, the latter authorised by a judge; the new law, in force from 2027 and challenged before the Federal Supreme Court, also provides for drones and biometric tools. Ticino’s data protection law prohibits profiling people for the lawful exercise of their rights. The Liberal Radical Party (PLR) is calling, among other things, for police custody to be extended from 24 to 48 hours and for closer surveillance of violent extremists. These measures are compatible with the standards as long as they remain individual; the 24-hour limit, however, is set by the federal Criminal Procedure Code (Art. 219(4) CrimPC), and the canton cannot change it on its own. On charging costs, the Federal Supreme Court has accepted in principle that organisers may be held liable, within the limits of proportionality (BGE 143 I 147). ODIHR’s October 2026 report on the surveillance of peaceful assemblies recommends transparency across the entire surveillance lifecycle, independent oversight and evidenced justifications whenever security is invoked. The backdrop: rising prices and rearmament An addendum rereads Bertrand Russell, José Ortega y Gasset and Oswald Spengler in the light of digital networks: impulse prevailing over reason, direct action without intermediaries, public truth as a product of repetition. Ortega and Spengler offer a diagnosis; Russell offers a remedy: education in doubt. War is the backdrop. Defence spending by the 27 EU member states rose from 218 billion euros in 2021 to 418 billion in 2025; in Germany, a military service questionnaire for 18-year-olds is back; in Switzerland, the 2027 relief package mainly serves to finance the army and the old-age pension system (AHV/AVS), while Parliament is debating a temporary VAT increase for armament. The slogan of the 20 November strike is «Fight for our future, not for their wars». What this means for Ticino Canton The report does not put forward partisan proposals, but identifies some conditions for effective prevention. For 20 November, timely dialogue with the organisers, who are identifiable, and a guarantee for the authorised march, without asking them to answer for others. For Lugano, measures limited in time and space, a protest site within sight and sound, and an invitation to independent monitors. Online, monitoring limited to violent groups, with a judge for closed spaces and a public report once the summit is over. Finally, investing in civic and media education at least as much as in security arrangements. The best prevention lies in clear rules decided in good time and in respect for the standards that Switzerland, this year, is called upon to promote. Niccolò Salvioni, political and institutional analyst, Ticinus — Centro Studi, Locarno
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22 October 2026
ITEN
Turmoil in the Squares
Turmoil in the Squares Executive report Public order, justice and prevention after the cost-of-living protests of October 2026: Italy, France, Germany and Switzerland compared, with a risk scenario for the OSCE Ministerial Council in Lugano Ticinus – Centro Studi · Locarno, 22 October 2026 Summary of the report “Piazze in tumulto: ordine pubblico, giustizia e prevenzione” (Streets in turmoil: public order, justice and prevention), to which readers are referred for sources and legal references (254 notes). Key findings • After the protests of 17 October, Switzerland’s neighbours responded in three different ways: Italy through criminal law, France through the administrative powers of its prefects, Germany through prevention within the framework of freedom of assembly. Ticino relies on a system that is already in place. • The hardest test is for the courts: many of those arrested are minors, often with no criminal record. Where juvenile judges were able to scale their measures, the response was firm without becoming collective. • Ticino’s critical mass is low: a march of 5,000 people with a violent core would require some 650 officers, more than half of the roughly 1,100 cantonal and municipal police officers. • The criminal duty-lawyer roster (seven lawyers and seven trainee lawyers per week) is sound for ordinary needs, but it is not sized for mass arrests. • For the OSCE Ministerial Council in Lugano (3-4 December 2026) the main risk is not a large authorised march, but the combination of a violent core from outside the canton, scattered actions called on social media, and a police force absorbed by the protection of delegations. Three models and the Swiss way • Italy. The decree-law of 20 October creates the offence of organised violence at demonstrations (Art. 420-bis of the Criminal Code), extends preventive detention of up to 12 hours (fermo di prevenzione) to crowded places, including for 16-year-olds, presumes that minors over 14 are criminally responsible, and sends 500 soldiers to Milan. The 12-hour detention has already been applied on a large scale (174 people held on 18 October), while the Court of Cassation’s research office (Ufficio del Massimario) has questioned its constitutionality. • France. No new legislation: night-time curfews and bans on gatherings within defined perimeters in about a dozen cities, ordered by prefects at a few hours’ notice. • Germany. Demonstrations are notified, not authorised; the day of protest on 31 October is being prepared with a focus on communication and de-escalation. • Ticino and Switzerland. Authorisation by the municipal executive, a ban on face coverings, police custody of up to 24 hours with access to a judge. From 1 January 2027 the new cantonal police act will introduce cantonal threat management and the use of drones at demonstrations; around ten of its provisions have been challenged before the Federal Supreme Court. The cantonal act on public video surveillance, in force since 1 July 2026, rules out facial recognition. Justice under pressure • Milan: 35 minors and 11 adults arrested; 31 of the 35 minors had no criminal record. The juvenile court preferred placement in residential communities and house arrest to the prison custody requested by prosecutors. • France: more than 2,500 people taken into police custody (garde à vue), more than 800 brought before a judge and 149 imprisoned; overloaded courtrooms, releases because time limits had expired, minors held overnight in court cells. Paris lawyers called for “défense massive”, with several lawyers defending each accused. • Germany: after the New Year’s Eve riots in Berlin, 576 proceedings were opened and 343 dropped, mostly because offenders could not be identified. Without individual evidence, prosecutions do not hold up. • Switzerland: the juvenile justice authority combines investigation, judgment and enforcement, an advantage provided it is sized for a sudden influx. In Bern, one year after the demonstration of 11 October 2025 (536 people checked, 101 identified), no penalty orders or final judgments have yet been reported. Lessons from reference cases • Nepal 2025: a social-media ban sparked an uprising that brought down the government; intelligence services had expected 3,000-5,000 protesters. • Peru 2025: the spark was a pension reform perceived as unfair to young people; one death in the streets turned the protest into a political crisis. • Geneva, G7 2026: rules for demonstrations decided more than three weeks in advance, border screening, containment with written safeguards, no serious injuries. Cost: about CHF 30 million, which France did not reimburse. • Ticino: Bellinzona and Camignolo (2025), where Federal Councillor Ignazio Cassis was the target of protests, and the protest gathering in Lugano (February 2026) reproduce the report’s dilemmas on a small scale: police accused of doing too little, too much, or of deploying more officers than there were protesters. Critical mass and “fluxcracy” Numbers alone are not enough: France was overwhelmed even with one officer for every nine protesters. What breaks coordination is initial underestimation, fragmentation into multiple hotspots, nightfall and the speed with which crowds are summoned on social media. The “fluxcracy” described by Asma Mhalla pits the time of the flow, measured in minutes, against the time of the law, measured in hours, days and years. The State does not need to win the race for speed; it must ensure that its own time remains the time of the rules. The military: protect, not disperse In Italy the Folgore paratroopers have no judicial police powers; in France the soldiers of Opération Sentinelle only guard buildings; in Germany the Federal Constitutional Court has held that dangers arising from a crowd of demonstrators do not justify the domestic use of military means. In Switzerland the army acts only in a subsidiary support role; deployments of more than 2,000 troops require the approval of the Federal Assembly. Milan in 1898 and Geneva in 1932 recall the price of getting it wrong. Soldiers can free up police officers by guarding fixed sites, but they must not be placed in contact with crowds. Recommendations for Ticino 1. Decide and make public by early November the rules for demonstrations during the OSCE conference, with an authorised route and dialogue with the organisers. 2. Consider with the Confederation targeted border checks, and inform businesses, cross-border workers and schools in good time. 3. Set out in advance the safeguards for any containment of protesters: a legal basis validated by the Public Prosecutor’s Office, priority for minors and vulnerable people, water, blankets and medical care. 4. Reinforce the criminal duty-lawyer roster and the juvenile justice authority for the days of the conference, with a back-up plan agreed between the Bar Association, the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the juvenile justice authority. 5. Separate adults and minors from the very first night and avoid holding minors overnight in cells, save in exceptional cases. 6. Keep soldiers to protection, surveillance and logistics, with no role whatsoever in dispersing demonstrations. 7. Adopt the OSCE/ODIHR Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly as the benchmark. 8. Invest in practical civic education: how a judge decides, what a criminal record entails, and why an order from the authorities must be obeyed (Art. 260(2) of the Swiss Criminal Code exempts from punishment those who leave a violent gathering when ordered to do so, provided they have neither committed nor incited violence). 9. Offer the parents of minors who have been arrested parenting support programmes, already possible under existing law through external support ordered by the juvenile court (Art. 13 of the Swiss Juvenile Criminal Law Act) or instructions from the child protection authority (Art. 307 of the Civil Code). The full report in Italian, with a comparative table of the four legal systems, the reference cases and 254 notes, is available on Ticinus. Niccolò Salvioni, independent political and institutional analyst, Centro studi Ticinus, Locarno, 22 October 2026