International mutual legal assistance in criminal matters
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20 August 2026
IT
Indagini su un decesso e garanzie di terzietà
L’oggetto. Questa nota non riguarda una vicenda specifica, ma un metodo: quali garanzie di terzietà debbano circondare l’accertamento di un decesso quando la persona deceduta risulti, per ragioni antecedenti e indipendenti dalla morte, pubblicamente collegata a un procedimento penale o a una vicenda istituzionale. Prosegue la riflessione avviata con la ricerca sul procuratore straordinario, estendendola dal momento della designazione all’intera filiera dell’accertamento. Ciò che questo testo non fa. Non deduce alcun nesso causale, non ipotizza responsabilità, non mette in dubbio l’operato di magistrati, polizia o medici legali. La presunzione d’innocenza opera integralmente. Nessuna persona è nominata. La terzietà come catena. L’imparzialità non si esaurisce nella figura del giudice. Attraversa chi interviene sul luogo dei fatti, chi compie i rilievi medico-legali, chi dirige l’istruzione, chi controlla e chi giudica. Ogni funzione conosce una forma diversa di indipendenza richiesta: massima per il giudice del merito (art. 30 Cost., art. 6 CEDU), diversa per il procuratore, cui si applica il dovere di obiettività dell’art. 3 CPP, esteso al perito per il rinvio dell’art. 183 cpv. 3 CPP. L’indipendenza dell’organo giudicante non corregge un deficit sorto nella fase di rilevamento: la prova medico-legale e i primi atti di polizia sono spesso irripetibili. Il precedente ticinese. Nella causa Scavuzzo-Hager e altri c. Svizzera (2006), relativa a un decesso avvenuto a Bellinzona dopo un intervento di polizia, la Corte europea non accertò una violazione sostanziale dell’art. 2 CEDU, ma ne riscontrò una nel versante procedurale: la fase iniziale delle indagini era stata svolta dagli stessi agenti coinvolti nell’intervento. Il principio operativo che ne discende non impone il trasferimento di ogni inchiesta a un’autorità esterna, ma obbliga a verificare se le garanzie ordinarie bastino a escludere dubbi oggettivamente ragionevoli. Misure graduabili, non sanzioni. Un supporto esterno non è sfiducia verso le autorità locali e non deve assumere un’unica forma. Può essere calibrato sulla funzione: affiancamento investigativo per i rilievi, perizia affidata a un istituto esterno, pluralità di periti, ricusazione individuale, diversa composizione del collegio. La prima domanda non è se trasferire l’inchiesta, ma se esista un motivo di ricusazione, se una riassegnazione interna basti, e quale intervento esterno sia il meno invasivo ma sufficiente. Identificazione e comunicazione. L’art. 74 CPP pone per le vittime una soglia più alta: fuori da un procedimento pubblico, l’identità può essere divulgata solo se la collaborazione della popolazione è necessaria all’accertamento o con il consenso, dopo la morte esprimibile dai congiunti. La particolare importanza pubblica del caso, da sola, non basta. La trasparenza non consiste nel rendere immediatamente pubblico tutto ciò che le autorità conoscono. Ciò che va tenuto distinto. La competenza federale non nasce dalla sensibilità politica di un caso, ma dalle fattispecie degli artt. 23 e seguenti CPP. E la presenza di elementi oltrefrontiera non federalizza l’inchiesta: apre semmai la via dell’assistenza giudiziaria, che richiede fatti concreti e non può trasformarsi in ricerca esplorativa. La conclusione. In un caso esposto a intensa attenzione pubblica la domanda corretta non è se l’autorità ordinaria sia presuntivamente inadeguata. È se il suo dispositivo d’indagine sia organizzato in modo da rendere controllabile, anche dall’esterno, l’indipendenza richiesta dallo Stato di diritto. Nessuna misura eccezionale senza elementi oggettivi; ma lo stesso rigore può imporre, nei casi realmente sensibili, che l’autorità valuti e motivi misure ulteriori.
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17 August 2026
ITDEFREN
Swiss law on neutrality — II: possible developments following the adoption of the constitutional amendment of 27 September
Whilst the first volume provided an overview of the existing law, this second volume takes the next step: it attempts to project it into the future. Having examined the current regulatory framework and the way in which the Government and Parliament relate to it, the study simulates what might happen if the initiative on neutrality were to be accepted on 27 September 2026. It is not, therefore, a prediction, but a reasoned simulation, based on the findings of the first volume and available historical precedents. The starting point is the constituent power of the popular initiative, illustrated through two contrasting precedents: the Lex Weber of 2012, which was unexpectedly accepted and implemented with disruptive speed; and the 2014 initiative on mass immigration, the implementation of which was stalled for years by European obligations, until a compromise was reached that effectively gutted its scope. These are the two models — one swift, the other contentious — against which to assess the possible effects of the new Article 54a. The study then reviews, in perspective, the themes of the first volume, and addresses some specific chapters: the effect of the shift from flexible to rigid neutrality on humanitarian credibility and the role of the ICRC; the consequences for the financial centre in the face of Western sanctions regimes; the review of sanctions that SECO is expected to conduct, including the fate of the approximately 7.4 billion in frozen assets and the likely shift in the authority’s remit, from monitoring sanctioned entities to monitoring financial flows; Switzerland’s autonomous countermeasures and, conversely, those that Western partners might adopt in response to a Swiss deviation. A chapter of particular interest concerns justiciability: constitutionalised neutrality enshrined in a specific prohibition could — following the model of the Lex Weber, which the Federal Supreme Court declared directly applicable — transform neutrality from an unchallengeable act of government into a test of legality that can be invoked, indirectly, by those affected by it. Such judicial review simply does not exist today, given that acts of foreign policy are not subject to judicial review. The study does not isolate the issue from its context. It highlights the two key issues driving the debate in recent weeks: the security argument, raised by opponents of the initiative, according to which rigid neutrality would weaken defence cooperation at precisely the moment when the European context is becoming unstable; and the convergence with the parallel ‘Bussola’ initiative, which addresses the same issue of the dynamic transposition of European law. Both neutrality and the Bilateral Agreements III, ultimately, revolve around the same question: how much sovereignty Switzerland is prepared to cede. Finally, the study examines the scenario of a rejection of the initiative and the more serious scenario of an open conflict between Russia and the Confederation’s Western partners. The overarching theme of the conclusions is that what is truly at stake on 27 September is not the choice between having or not having neutrality — Switzerland will remain neutral in either case — but rather the choice between two ways of being neutral: a flexible neutrality, which preserves the political scope to align itself selectively, and a rigid neutrality, which sacrifices that scope in exchange for a predefined and consistent position. A choice which, as demonstrated by the Bilateral Agreements III issue and the ‘Compass’ initiative, is merely the first step in a broader redefinition of the relationship between sovereignty, direct democracy and European integration.
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16 August 2026
ITDEFREN
Swiss law on neutrality — Part I: a comprehensive systematic overview
Swiss law on neutrality — Part I: a comprehensive systematic overview With just a few weeks to go before the federal vote on 27 September 2026 on the popular initiative on neutrality, this study offers a systematic review of what Swiss law currently provides for in this area. The starting question is as simple as it is rarely asked: what are, at present, all the provisions — at constitutional, legislative, regulatory and international levels — that govern, directly or indirectly, the Confederation’s neutrality? The findings of the research are surprising in several respects. The Federal Constitution mentions neutrality in only two provisions (Articles 173 and 185), and does so not to define its content, but to assign responsibility for safeguarding it to the Federal Assembly and the Federal Council. The legislation most closely related to the subject — the Embargoes Act, the War Material Act and the Dual-Use Goods Control Act — never mentions neutrality, operating instead through general clauses requiring compliance with international law. This gives rise to the central issue of today’s debate: under current law, neutrality is a discretionary power, not a substantive principle with binding content. The silence of the Federal Supreme Court, which treats it as an act of government beyond judicial review, confirms this. It is precisely this framework that the initiative put to the vote seeks to amend, transforming a margin of political manoeuvre into a substantive constitutional constraint. The study also examines, as case studies, the 2022 sanctions against Russia and their relationship with the status of neutrality; the Bilateral Agreements III and the absence therein of any clause on neutrality; the revision of the War Material Act; and historical precedents in which Switzerland adopted a stricter form of neutrality (from the League of Nations to Rhodesia). This research constitutes the first of two volumes. The second, devoted to scenarios for how the situation might evolve should the initiative be accepted, will follow shortly as a sequel. This is a wide-ranging study that seeks to map out the multitude of aspects directly or indirectly influenced by neutrality, as a multifaceted mechanism of public international law. I have endeavoured to be as precise as possible and to thoroughly verify the sources on which this work is based. Should any errors or omissions come to light, I shall be happy to correct them or incorporate new elements in a subsequent edition.
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8 May 2022
ITDEFREN
Sanctions by Swiss federal Department of Economic Affairs, and Freezing and Restitution of Illicit Assets held by Foreign Politically Exposed Persons by the Department of Justice and Department of Foreign affairs
Switzerland’s Dual-Track Response to Illicit Wealth and Sanctioned States Switzerland manages sanctions and illicit-asset recovery through two distinct legal channels, reflecting its layered federal architecture. Trade and financial sanctions against foreign states, entities and individuals — implementing UN, OSCE or partner-country measures — fall under the Embargo Act (LEmb), enforced by SECO within the Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research. These sanctions freeze funds and economic resources of listed persons and restrict trade in goods, services and capital. A separate instrument, the 2015 Act on the Freezing and Restitution of Illicit Assets of Foreign Politically Exposed Persons (LVP), addresses a narrower but politically sensitive problem: assets held in Switzerland by former foreign heads of state or senior officials suspected of corruption, typically after they lose power in a political upheaval. Here, the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs orders the initial freeze — often within days of a regime change, as with Tunisia’s Ben Ali, Egypt’s Mubarak and Ukraine’s Yanukovych — to preserve assets while the foreign state pursues mutual legal assistance proceedings. If that state’s judicial system is too weakened to complete the process, the Federal Department of Finance can petition the Federal Administrative Court for outright confiscation, relying on a legal presumption that unexplained, disproportionate wealth accumulated during a corrupt regime is of illicit origin. Recovered funds are channelled back not to the state’s treasury directly, but into public-interest programmes benefiting the population, with FDFA supervision. The distinction matters: sanctions under LEmb are a foreign-policy and trade-control tool tied to international coordination, while the LVP mechanism is a targeted anti-corruption and asset-recovery procedure specific to Swiss financial-centre integrity, sitting at the intersection of foreign policy, criminal law and international assistance.