Bilateral Agreements III
-
23 August 2026
ITDEFREN
Common destiny or "à la carte" neutrality? Singapore and Switzerland compared
Common destiny or "à la carte" neutrality? Singapore and Switzerland compared Starting from a 1988 speech by Lee Kuan Yew — at once a warning and a founding act of Singapore's national narrative — this analysis builds a systematic comparison between two exposed small states at opposite ends of the world, Singapore and Switzerland. It is the distance between them, rather than any presumed similarity, that makes the exercise fruitful: it allows one to separate what is structurally necessary to a small state's survival from what is merely contingent or the product of political choice. The comparison unfolds on several planes. On the side of convergence: the centrality of institutional continuity; the doctrine of vulnerability elevated into a founding identity; the strategic management of national reserves (sovereign wealth funds and secrecy in Singapore, National Bank reserves in Switzerland); "porcupine" defence, built on a militia army and universal conscription; and the shared condition of multilingual and multi-faith societies, in which cohesion must be manufactured rather than inherited. On the side of divergence in method: Singapore's social engineering from above — rigorous meritocracy, a top civil service paid on a par with the private sector, ethnic quotas imposed in public housing, English as a neutral working language — set against the Swiss model of militia service, territorial autonomy and parity among the national languages. The central question is neutrality. In principle, Bern and the city-state diverge radically: one neutral by identity, the other openly non-aligned. Yet on the concrete ground of security policy the distance narrows almost to nothing: de facto alignment with Western defence architecture, the same weapons systems, sanctions on Russia adopted by breaking with long-standing practice. The analysis also examines the legal nature of Swiss neutrality — defined by no statute, managed "à la carte" by the executive — and the debate opened by the Neutrality Initiative, put to the vote on 27 September 2026. The result is a paradox: for an exposed small state, the legal label matters far less than the material logic of survival. Neutrality thus proves to be less a condition of law than a mode of risk management. A postscript carries the reflection to its conclusion: since neutrality is an inherently war-related institution and Switzerland’s geographical exposure to a great-power conflict is far sharper than Singapore’s, the Confederation is eroding the very instrument its position makes most necessary — and its convergence with the city-state proves, on closer view, less reassuring than it appears.
-
17 August 2026
ITDEFREN
Swiss law on neutrality — II: possible developments following the adoption of the constitutional amendment of 27 September
Whilst the first volume provided an overview of the existing law, this second volume takes the next step: it attempts to project it into the future. Having examined the current regulatory framework and the way in which the Government and Parliament relate to it, the study simulates what might happen if the initiative on neutrality were to be accepted on 27 September 2026. It is not, therefore, a prediction, but a reasoned simulation, based on the findings of the first volume and available historical precedents. The starting point is the constituent power of the popular initiative, illustrated through two contrasting precedents: the Lex Weber of 2012, which was unexpectedly accepted and implemented with disruptive speed; and the 2014 initiative on mass immigration, the implementation of which was stalled for years by European obligations, until a compromise was reached that effectively gutted its scope. These are the two models — one swift, the other contentious — against which to assess the possible effects of the new Article 54a. The study then reviews, in perspective, the themes of the first volume, and addresses some specific chapters: the effect of the shift from flexible to rigid neutrality on humanitarian credibility and the role of the ICRC; the consequences for the financial centre in the face of Western sanctions regimes; the review of sanctions that SECO is expected to conduct, including the fate of the approximately 7.4 billion in frozen assets and the likely shift in the authority’s remit, from monitoring sanctioned entities to monitoring financial flows; Switzerland’s autonomous countermeasures and, conversely, those that Western partners might adopt in response to a Swiss deviation. A chapter of particular interest concerns justiciability: constitutionalised neutrality enshrined in a specific prohibition could — following the model of the Lex Weber, which the Federal Supreme Court declared directly applicable — transform neutrality from an unchallengeable act of government into a test of legality that can be invoked, indirectly, by those affected by it. Such judicial review simply does not exist today, given that acts of foreign policy are not subject to judicial review. The study does not isolate the issue from its context. It highlights the two key issues driving the debate in recent weeks: the security argument, raised by opponents of the initiative, according to which rigid neutrality would weaken defence cooperation at precisely the moment when the European context is becoming unstable; and the convergence with the parallel ‘Bussola’ initiative, which addresses the same issue of the dynamic transposition of European law. Both neutrality and the Bilateral Agreements III, ultimately, revolve around the same question: how much sovereignty Switzerland is prepared to cede. Finally, the study examines the scenario of a rejection of the initiative and the more serious scenario of an open conflict between Russia and the Confederation’s Western partners. The overarching theme of the conclusions is that what is truly at stake on 27 September is not the choice between having or not having neutrality — Switzerland will remain neutral in either case — but rather the choice between two ways of being neutral: a flexible neutrality, which preserves the political scope to align itself selectively, and a rigid neutrality, which sacrifices that scope in exchange for a predefined and consistent position. A choice which, as demonstrated by the Bilateral Agreements III issue and the ‘Compass’ initiative, is merely the first step in a broader redefinition of the relationship between sovereignty, direct democracy and European integration.
-
16 August 2026
ITDEFREN
Swiss law on neutrality — Part I: a comprehensive systematic overview
Swiss law on neutrality — Part I: a comprehensive systematic overview With just a few weeks to go before the federal vote on 27 September 2026 on the popular initiative on neutrality, this study offers a systematic review of what Swiss law currently provides for in this area. The starting question is as simple as it is rarely asked: what are, at present, all the provisions — at constitutional, legislative, regulatory and international levels — that govern, directly or indirectly, the Confederation’s neutrality? The findings of the research are surprising in several respects. The Federal Constitution mentions neutrality in only two provisions (Articles 173 and 185), and does so not to define its content, but to assign responsibility for safeguarding it to the Federal Assembly and the Federal Council. The legislation most closely related to the subject — the Embargoes Act, the War Material Act and the Dual-Use Goods Control Act — never mentions neutrality, operating instead through general clauses requiring compliance with international law. This gives rise to the central issue of today’s debate: under current law, neutrality is a discretionary power, not a substantive principle with binding content. The silence of the Federal Supreme Court, which treats it as an act of government beyond judicial review, confirms this. It is precisely this framework that the initiative put to the vote seeks to amend, transforming a margin of political manoeuvre into a substantive constitutional constraint. The study also examines, as case studies, the 2022 sanctions against Russia and their relationship with the status of neutrality; the Bilateral Agreements III and the absence therein of any clause on neutrality; the revision of the War Material Act; and historical precedents in which Switzerland adopted a stricter form of neutrality (from the League of Nations to Rhodesia). This research constitutes the first of two volumes. The second, devoted to scenarios for how the situation might evolve should the initiative be accepted, will follow shortly as a sequel. This is a wide-ranging study that seeks to map out the multitude of aspects directly or indirectly influenced by neutrality, as a multifaceted mechanism of public international law. I have endeavoured to be as precise as possible and to thoroughly verify the sources on which this work is based. Should any errors or omissions come to light, I shall be happy to correct them or incorporate new elements in a subsequent edition.
-
14 August 2026
ITEN
Bilateral Agreements III: Federal Council closes ro Double Majority; Parliament Remains Divided
This summary serves as a parallel update to the analysis published in Ticinus on August 14, 2026, titled “Switzerland–EU Bilateral Agreements III: Institutional Challenges for Swiss Democracy.” Within the same 24 hours that article was published, the Federal Council blocked two parallel paths toward a mandatory referendum on the Bilateral Agreements III—a parliamentary initiative and a popular initiative—with outcomes that warrant a joint reading. The facts: two doors closed in one day On August 12, 2026, the Federal Council rejected Parliamentary Initiative 26.425 of the Council of States’ Committee on Political Institutions (CIP-S), which called for subjecting the Bilateral Agreements III to a mandatory referendum through a transitional constitutional provision. The government reiterated its position of April 30, 2025: in its view, the agreements do not meet the requirements of Art. 140, para. 1 of the Constitution (admin.ch). The following day, August 13, the Federal Council also adopted the message on the “Bussola” popular initiative, recommending its rejection without a counterproposal (EJPD). The institutional difference between the two cases, however, is decisive. The CIP-S depends on approval by the Council of States, where the government’s negative opinion carries direct weight; the chambers remain divided, however, with the Council of States’ Foreign Affairs Committee opposing it by a vote of 8 to 5 and the corresponding committee in the National Council supporting it by margins of 16 to 9 and 15 to 10 (parlament.ch; SVP Zürich). The Bussola initiative, on the other hand, has already collected 111,422 valid signatures and formally reached the quorum on October 21, 2025: the Federal Council may recommend its rejection, but it cannot prevent the people from voting on it, as a transitional provision would require a new referendum—this time mandatory—on the Bilateral Agreements III if the vote on the Bussola initiative were to take place after the vote on the Switzerland-EU package (Reuters). Analysis: A Three-Way Standoff, and Two Unresolved Asymmetries Viewed as a whole, the issue takes the form of a constitutional standoff involving three actors—the Federal Council, Parliament, and the people—in which each controls a different lever, and in which the Compass remains the only lever that the other two cannot neutralize: its retroactive clause is, under current law, the only instrument still capable of bringing the Bilateral Agreements III back to a double-majority vote after their eventual ratification. Two asymmetries, already noted in the November 2025 reference analysis, remain unresolved by these developments. The first is economic: the package accounts for about 40% of federal GDP but about 60% of Ticino’s GDP, due to the canton’s high level of cross-border integration and the 80,000 cross-border workers employed there—an exposure one and a half times higher than the national average, which the optional referendum alone does not allow to be treated as a separate item. The second concerns neutrality: none of the agreements contains a horizontal clause excluding the use of Swiss infrastructure, energy, data, or research for purposes incompatible with neutrality in the dual-use sectors covered by the package (energy, space, research, and healthcare). On September 27, 2026, voters will vote separately on the “Safeguarding Swiss Neutrality” initiative — but even its defeat, which polls suggest is likely (54% opposed, 34% in favor as of June 2026, Corriere del Ticino), would leave the specific gap regarding Bilateral Agreements III intact, shifting political weight—if anything—to the “Bussola” as a residual channel. Conclusion Nine months after the Bellinzona report, the events of August 12–13 confirm rather than refute the interpretation proposed at that time: the absence of a stable constitutional requirement regarding the type of referendum leaves a decision—which should be based on a predictable criterion applicable regardless of who is in power and which agreement is under discussion—to the political discretion of the moment. The issue remains squarely political and will shift to the upcoming weeks of parliamentary debate on Initiative 26.425, to the campaign for the September 27 vote on neutrality, and—in the longer term—to a possible vote on the Bussola itself. For the relevant institutional analysis, including a comprehensive mapping of the regulatory impact of the Third Round of Bilateral Agreements, see the article published in Ticinus: “Switzerland–EU Bilateral Agreements III: Institutional Challenges for Swiss Democracy.”
-
20 January 2026
ITEN
Bilateral Agreements III: Switzerland–EU—Institutional Issues and Their Implications
Bilateral Agreements III CH–EU: Institutional Questions and Their Ramifications Contextualization Outline of the address delivered in Mendrisio (the Filanda) on 17 January 2026, at the conference on Bilaterals III organized by the NO EU, NO NATO group. Niccolò Salvioni's talk opened the proceedings by setting out the underlying institutional coordinates, followed by contributions from Graziano Pestoni (the electricity agreement), Leonardo Schmidt (free movement of persons), and Alberto Togni (EU–NATO relations and neutrality). The text was reworked and expanded after the conference, with subsequent additions on cybersecurity and the European informational dimension. Published on 20 January 2026. Annotated Table of Contents Preamble — The mandate of the address: four constitutional questions the Federal Council avoided across the 896 pages of the explanatory report (13 June 2025). Block 1 — The numerical scope. The amplifying effect: 1–1.5% of the EU acquis translates into 12–16% of Swiss federal legislation, with cantonal (14–18 Ticino laws) and municipal ramifications. Block 2 — The transformation of the system. From the static model of Bilaterals I–II (1999–2021) to binding dynamic adoption (from 2025); the anomalous speed of negotiations (197 meetings in 9 months versus the 7 years of Bilaterals I). Block 3 — The six critical institutional pillars. Binding CJEU jurisdiction; decision shaping (participation without representation, contrasting the Norwegian veto under Art. 102 EEA with Switzerland's "illusory deferral"); cross-retaliation measures; the asymmetry of immunity of EU officials; Switzerland's hybrid status as a "microstate"; the marginalization of Parliament and the people. Block 4 — The civil-military dual-use dimension. The Federal Council's silence on the strategic-military dimension; the mid-term reform of EU cohesion policy (COM(2025) 163, objective RSO 3.3); the excursuses on Switzerland–EU–NATO cyber cooperation and on the threat to Swiss media independence (DSA, EMFA, Digital Europe Programme); the critical agreements (energy, land transport, air transport); neutrality from commercial freedom to infrastructural constraint, with the historical precedents of the Gotthard 1914–1918 and Switzerland 1939–1945. Block 5 — The chronological paradox. The coincidence between the launch of the "package" (23 February 2022) and the invasion of Ukraine (24 February); the adoption of sanctions within four days; the hypothetical "Summer 2028" war scenario. Block 6 — GDP impact and irreversibility. 40% of federal GDP involved; the cohesion contribution (over CHF 3 billion, 2030–2036); strategic irreversibility. Block 7 — Federalism and the equality of the cantons (Arts. 3, 43, 46 of the Constitution). The asymmetry of impact between border cantons (Ticino, 60% of GDP) and inland cantons (15%), with the republican paradox of majority voting. Conclusion — The four unanswered questions: mandatory referendum (Art. 140), compatibility with neutrality, strategic irreversibility, federalist compatibility. Synthesis The paper examines Bilaterals III not from the economic or sectoral standpoint, but from the institutional and constitutional one. Its central thesis is that the shift from a static system to one of binding dynamic adoption transforms between 12 and 16% of federal legislation, subjects disputes to the binding jurisdiction of the CJEU, and introduces cross-retaliation between agreements—thereby constituting, though without declaring it, an accession to a supranational community that ought to trigger the mandatory referendum under Art. 140 of the Constitution. The author develops two particularly original strands. The first is the comparison with Norway and the United Kingdom: both states, though NATO members or bound to the EU by defence partnerships, retain greater legislative sovereignty than "neutral" Switzerland, which accepts infrastructural constraints comparable to those of an Atlantic ally without possessing either the Norwegian veto (Art. 102 EEA) or the British capacity to refuse automatic commitments. From this follows the "triangular paradox" of a neutrality that is neutral only de jure while amounting to a de facto alignment. The second strand is the dual-use gap: across the report's 896 pages there is no analysis whatsoever of the compatibility between the integration of critical infrastructure (energy via ENTSO-E/ACER, the Alpine corridors, airspace) and the neutrality obligations of the 1907 Hague Conventions. Drawing on the Gotthard precedents, the author argues that neutrality does not prohibit trade but requires sovereign control over strategic infrastructure—control that binding integration compromises. To this is added the extension of the problem into the informational sphere, with the risk of a "soft external steering" of public-service media through the DSA, the EMFA, and co-financed algorithms. The analysis closes with the federalist question: the asymmetric impact across cantons (up to 60% of Ticino's GDP against 15% for the inland cantons) receives no consideration in the report, even though the referendum vote assigns equal weight to cantons with radically different exposure. The concluding message, addressed to Ticino, claims as a minimum republican guarantee the mandatory referendum for decisions that alter 60% of the cantonal economy.
-
23 November 2025
ITDEFREN
Switzerland–EU Bilateral Agreements III: Institutional Challenges for Swiss Democracy
Premise and historical context On 23 November 2025, at the Casa del Popolo in Bellinzona, Niccolò Salvioni delivered the opening address at the conference «Switzerland-EU agreements: what dangers for democracy, labour and public service?», organised by the cross-party committee «No EU No NATO». It was followed by talks from Graziano Pestoni (crisis of the European neoliberal model and the public energy service), Leonardo Schmid (labour market and the status of cross-border workers) and Alberto Togni (sovereignty and defence). That date falls at a precise point in the Bilaterals III timeline: the federal consultation, launched by the Federal Council in June 2025, had just closed (end of October 2025), while the signing of the agreements in Brussels was still to come. Since then, the picture has moved on three fronts: 2 March 2026 — Swiss Confederation President Guy Parmelin and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen sign the package of agreements, protocols and the joint declaration on the high-level dialogue in Brussels (the agreement on EU programmes had already been signed in November 2025) (EDA; RSI). 13 March 2026 — the Federal Council adopts the dispatch to Parliament; the parliamentary phase opens and is still under way between the National Council and the Council of States (EDA). 12 August 2026 — one day before this summary, the Federal Council rejects the parliamentary initiative of the Council of States' Political Institutions Committee (PIC-S), which had called for a constitutional amendment to subject Bilaterals III to a mandatory referendum. The Government confirms its position of 30 April 2025 in favour of an optional referendum (EDA). A popular vote nonetheless remains likely, tentatively in 2027 or 2028. The mandatory-referendum question — that is, the demand for a double majority (of the people and of the cantons) rather than a mere optional referendum — was already at the centre of the Bellinzona address, and it remains today the one point in the timeline where the Federal Council's position and that of ten cantons, Ticino among them, are still in direct conflict. What follows is a summary of that address's content, with the data and arguments as presented on 23 November 2025 — to be read bearing in mind that the package is now signed and under debate in Parliament, no longer merely a negotiating hypothesis. The facts: figures and regulatory impact Switzerland–EU relations currently rest on around 120 agreements, chiefly Bilaterals I (1999) and II (2004, Schengen/Dublin), locked in "static" mode: any change requires unanimity and lengthy negotiations. Bilaterals III introduce 9 main instruments — institutional updates (free movement, transport, MRA, agriculture), new agreements (energy, food safety, health) and cooperation schemes (EU programmes, space agency) — and shift to dynamic incorporation of EU law. EU regulations involved: 150-200 main acts, up to 350 including delegated ones, totalling 1,800-2,000 pages — 1-1.5% of the acquis communautaire (170,000-180,000 pages, 23,000-25,000 acts). Swiss legislation involved: 80-100 federal laws out of 600-650 (12-16%) and 200-250 federal ordinances out of about 2,000; an estimated 6,000-7,000 pages of federal legislation, roughly 20% of the total corpus. Cantonal and municipal level: 30-50 laws per canton (14-18% in Ticino); 15-25 municipal regulations (18-25%), with a disproportionate impact on border municipalities such as Chiasso, Mendrisio and Lugano and on medium-to-large towns such as Bellinzona and Locarno. Economic impact: a hypothesised 40% of federal GDP (energy, transport, labour market, food safety, research) and 60% of Ticino's GDP, given the canton's high cross-border integration and its 80,000 cross-border workers (about 20% of the national total, over 35% of the cantonal workforce). The address notes in its appendix that these percentages are reconstructive estimates, not confirmed official figures. Direct financial costs: over CHF 2 billion (CHF 2,005.08 million) for EU cohesion over 2030-2036, plus a further CHF 1,013.7 million in supplementary financial commitments, on top of annual contributions to Horizon Europe, Erasmus+ and the GNSS space programmes. Cantonal vote: 21 cantons in favour; Schwyz, Nidwalden, Schaffhausen and Ticino against (Obwalden abstaining). Ticino justified its opposing vote by pointing to reservations over the safeguard clause, the financial compensation mechanisms and the uncertainties surrounding the electricity agreement. Ten cantons, including Ticino, are calling for a mandatory referendum. The analysis Sovereignty traded away. The address compares the EU contributions (over CHF 2 billion) with the USD 200 billion (~CHF 176 billion) in investments agreed with the United States to avoid punitive tariffs. Since the EU absorbs 48-50% of Swiss exports against 16-18% for the US, applying the same ratio would require Switzerland to pay Brussels between CHF 540 and 600 billion. The much lower actual figure is read as evidence of an asymmetric exchange: paying less in financial terms, Switzerland accepts mandatory dynamic incorporation of EU law, constraints on cantonal state aid, and the loss of strategic energy competences, in sectors that account for 40% of federal GDP. Key institutional mechanisms. Mandatory (though not automatic) dynamic incorporation, with alignment required within two years and postponement possible only via referendum; decision shaping without voting rights; a Joint Committee deciding by consensus; a mixed arbitration tribunal bound by preliminary rulings from the EU Court of Justice (CJEU) on matters of EU law; compensatory measures with the possibility of cross-retaliation (retaliation even in sectors unrelated to the specific breach). Constitutional erosion. The address cites Prof. Glaser (legislative sovereignty becomes an economic cost rather than a real option) and Prof. Richli (a material amendment of Art. 3 of the Constitution on cantonal sovereignty, Art. 163 on the form of laws, Art. 189 on the role of the Federal Supreme Court, and Art. 34 on political rights). Comparison with other models. The European Economic Area (Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein) incorporates around 5,000 directives but with a right of consultation and permanent representation in Brussels. Post-Brexit United Kingdom has rejected both dynamic incorporation and CJEU jurisdiction, remaining outside the EU's mutual defence clause (Art. 42.7 TEU). Pre-accession states (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Serbia) harmonise progressively but know they will gain a decision-making voice once they join. Switzerland, according to the address, would under Bilaterals III reach a level of integration higher than post-Brexit Britain and comparable to that of pre-accession states, yet without voting rights under any scenario — described as an «organised anomaly» with no real international equivalent. The hermit crab and sea anemone metaphor. The address proposes the symbiosis between the hermit crab and the sea anemone as a reading of Switzerland's position: mutual protection as long as the waters stay calm, but the risk of being «dragged into the same currents» should the EU venture into sanctions, NATO-aligned positions or trade conflicts that Switzerland does not share. It recalls Hersch Lauterpacht's 1936 formula: «collective security and neutrality are mutually exclusive». Conclusion and proposal The address characterises the government's choice not to submit Bilaterals III to a mandatory referendum as a sign of a worrying disconnect between federal institutions and popular sovereignty — an argument taken up by the Lega and the SVP/UDC, and echoed in Ticino's opposing cantonal vote. The central proposal, back in November 2025, was unambiguous: only a mandatory referendum, requiring a vote of both the people and the cantons, can ensure that a change of this constitutional magnitude respects the federal will — invoking Switzerland as a «Willensnation» capable of continually regenerating consensus, rather than sliding into a mere «induced reactivity» to European rules. Nine months on, the Federal Council's decision of 12 August 2026 to reject the PIC-S initiative for a mandatory referendum settles this point, for now, against the line argued in Bellinzona: the Government maintains its proposal for an optional referendum, leaving Parliament to have the final say on the type of procedure (EDA fact sheet on legal aspects). The issue therefore remains openly political, and will carry over into the coming weeks of parliamentary debate and, in all likelihood, into the 2027-2028 referendum campaign. Original address: Niccolò Salvioni, «Bilaterali CH-UE III: le sfide istituzionali per la democrazia svizzera» (Bilaterals CH-EU III: the institutional challenges for Swiss democracy), Bellinzona, 23 November 2025.
-
5 August 2023
IT
Un dazio dinamico per passare il San Gottardo con automobili private durante i periodi di forte traffico allo scopo di scaglionare il traffico autostradale?
Nota preliminare: il contesto in cui è stato scritto Il testo originale — “Un dazio dinamico per passare il San Gottardo con automobili private durante i periodi di forte traffico allo scopo di scaglionare il traffico autostradale?”, di Niccolò Salvioni — è stato redatto a Locarno tra il 23 e il 25 agosto 2023. Va letto tenendo presente il momento preciso in cui nasce, perché diversi elementi che oggi diamo per acquisiti erano allora ancora aperti o recentissimi: • Erano trascorse solo due settimane dal deragliamento del 10 agosto 2023 nella galleria di base ferroviaria del San Gottardo, causato dalla rottura di una ruota di un treno merci: l’infrastruttura ferroviaria era inagibile e il testo ne tiene conto come fattore che avrebbe aumentato, nell’immediato, la pressione di traffico sulla strada. • La seconda canna autostradale del San Gottardo era appena entrata nella fase preparatoria (gli scavi principali non erano ancora iniziati) e l’orizzonte di apertura allora ipotizzato era il 2029. • Il dossier federale del Mobility Pricing era in fase di studio di fattibilità dal 2021, senza alcuna decisione del Consiglio federale. • Come dato di contesto sulla crescita post-pandemica della mobilità, l’autore richiama il record di Flightradar24 del 13 luglio 2023 (205’468 voli tracciati in 24 ore). In questo quadro — pre-riapertura della galleria di base, pre-avvio degli scavi principali della seconda canna, dossier Mobility Pricing ancora tutto da scrivere — l’autore esamina un’ipotesi allora puramente dottrinale, mai tradotta in un progetto legislativo: un dazio “dinamico”, applicabile solo nei periodi di punta, per scaglionare il traffico privato al Gottardo. Il contenuto del testo Il ragionamento si sviluppa attraverso quattro ordini di limiti giuridici, seguiti da una valutazione d’insieme. I limiti costituzionali. L’art. 82 Cost. sancisce la gratuità dell’uso delle strade pubbliche, ammettendo eccezioni solo su autorizzazione dell’Assemblea federale: l’unica finora concessa riguarda il tunnel del Gran San Bernardo, gestito in condominio con l’Italia dal 1958. L’art. 84 Cost. affida invece alla Confederazione il compito di proteggere la regione alpina dagli effetti nocivi del traffico di transito — una base di legittimazione finalistica, non però una base per riscuotere un dazio. I limiti di mercato interno. La legge federale sul mercato interno del 1995 garantisce l’accesso libero e non discriminato al mercato su tutto il territorio svizzero. Le restrizioni sono ammesse solo se si applicano ugualmente a residenti e non residenti, sono indispensabili per interessi pubblici preponderanti e rispettano la proporzionalità: un dazio che colpisse selettivamente i transiti da e verso il Ticino rischierebbe di scontrarsi con questo principio. Il ruolo dell’USTRA e la legge sulle strade nazionali. Dal 1960 le vie di collegamento di interesse generale sono dichiarate strade nazionali dall’Assemblea federale; dal 2008 la loro gestione operativa è passata dai Cantoni alla Confederazione, con l’USTRA responsabile del coordinamento strategico (Direttiva generale VM-NS, ASTRA 15003). Un eventuale dazio dinamico rientrerebbe presumibilmente tra le sue competenze sistemiche, ma richiederebbe comunque una base legale ad hoc. I vincoli internazionali. L’accordo del 1999 tra Svizzera e Comunità europea sul trasporto di merci e passeggeri su strada e ferrovia impone non discriminazione, proporzionalità e trasparenza nella tariffazione del traffico transalpino. La Convenzione delle Alpi, nei suoi protocolli su trasporti (2000) e turismo (1998), spinge verso il trasferimento modale su rotaia e la riduzione degli effetti negativi del traffico intralpino, senza però vietare di per sé una tariffazione del traffico privato, purché non discriminatoria e concordata con i paesi vicini. La valutazione conclusiva del 2023. Il diritto internazionale, conclude l’autore, non esclude in linea di principio una tariffazione del traffico privato transalpino; l’ostacolo principale è interno e costituzionale — il divieto federale di dazi interni, posto a tutela di un mercato nazionale omogeneo, Ticino compreso. Un dazio non potrebbe legalmente esentare ticinesi e urani senza violare il divieto internazionale di discriminazione, il che renderebbe la misura politicamente delicata per il Cantone più esposto ai suoi effetti. Il testo segnala inoltre rischi pratici concreti: la deviazione del traffico verso altri valichi (con il precedente del traffico merci “deviato” verso il Brennero dopo l’Iniziativa delle Alpi del 1994), l’eventuale spostamento della pressione sul San Bernardino, la complessità tecnica di un sistema di riscossione multi-tecnologico e multilingue, e il rischio che un dazio sostenibile sul piano politico risulti troppo basso per essere davvero dissuasivo. Vengono infine indicate alternative allora — e tuttora — poco esplorate dalla pianificazione federale: treni navetta per auto attraverso la vecchia galleria, treni notte internazionali, e una maggiore integrazione della navigazione interna (Lago Maggiore, pontile di Maroggia) nella rete di trasporto pubblico regionale. Cosa è cambiato da allora Alcuni fatti citati o ipotizzati nel testo originale hanno oggi un esito verificabile: • La galleria di base ferroviaria è tornata pienamente operativa il 2 settembre 2024, dopo lavori di ripristino stimati in circa 150 milioni di franchi a seguito del deragliamento dell’agosto 2023 (SBB News; rapporto finale SISI, swissinfo). • La seconda canna autostradale è oggi in piena fase di scavo; l’apertura al traffico, inizialmente ipotizzata per il 2029, è ora ufficialmente fissata al 2030, con successivo risanamento della prima canna fino al 2033: solo da allora entrambe le gallerie saranno disponibili contemporaneamente (galleriasangottardo.ch – USTRA). • Il Mobility Pricing non è stato né adottato né accantonato: l’USTRA ha condotto quattro studi di fattibilità (Turgovia, Ginevra, un progetto FFS sul trasporto pubblico e un progetto a partecipazione volontaria con Argovia e Zugo) e sta elaborando un rapporto di sintesi che, insieme agli esiti della consultazione, dovrà orientare la decisione del Consiglio federale sul futuro dello strumento (USTRA, Il Mobility Pricing). È un dato tecnico rilevante non affrontato esplicitamente nel testo del 2023: i progetti di mobility pricing esaminati finora si basano su un rilevamento chilometrico satellitare (GNSS), sul modello già in uso per la tassa sul traffico pesante (TTPCP/LSVA), e non sulla lettura ottica delle targhe — una distinzione tecnologica che inciderebbe direttamente sulle implicazioni in materia di protezione dei dati di un eventuale dazio dinamico. • Il traffico stagionale al portale nord del San Gottardo resta un fenomeno strutturale, con code chilometriche ricorrenti nei periodi di punta anche nell’estate 2026. • Nessuna iniziativa legislativa federale ha finora ripreso, in modo specifico, l’ipotesi di un dazio dinamico riservato al traffico privato al Gottardo: l’analisi del 2023 resta, ad oggi, un contributo dottrinale piuttosto che la descrizione di un processo in corso.