Neutrality and institutions

2 October 2026

Bilateral Agreements III, Double Majority, and Water: What the Electricity Agreement Means for Ticino

Research Summary In December 2025, I had offered some critical reflections on the electricity agreement between Switzerland and the European Union. Ten months later, the situation has changed on three fronts. The first is the Federal Council’s message of March 13, 2026. The second is the Council of States’ decision to subject the core package to a double majority vote by the people and the cantons. The third is the drought of summer 2026, which brought Lake Maggiore more than 46 centimeters below the hydrometric zero. What has been scaled back Concessions, water fees, the right of return, and public ownership of facilities remain outside the scope of the agreement, and the EU shares this interpretation. Fears of a competitive bidding process for concessions are not reflected in the text. Universal service at regulated prices protects households. What is confirmed The dynamic application of EU law remains, as do state aid rules—which restrict cantonal energy policy—and a disproportionate regulatory burden on small distributors. The agreement, however, benefits large producers such as AET, as it enhances the flexibility of reservoirs in European markets. A law in flux The dynamic application carries greater weight because European energy law is not stable. The EU is simplifying product legislation and streamlining procedures, but it is actually tightening regulations on the electricity market, as demonstrated by the August 2026 proposal on grid tariffs. Switzerland will be able to help shape these developments, but not co-decide them. The Federal Council counters that this evolution is not automatic: every development must pass through the Joint Committee and internal procedures, including a referendum. The institutional sticking point The electricity agreement is the subject of a separate federal decree, and the Council of States has not yet reviewed it. However, it cannot enter into force without the core package. The cantons’ influence in the double majority system therefore effectively extends to electricity as well. Furthermore, the package does not affect the cantons equally: according to estimates by Ticinus, for border cantons such as Ticino, the impact could reach 60% of cantonal GDP, compared to about 15% for inland cantons. The double majority does not weight the cantons according to their exposure but ensures that each has a say as such. The new front: water Three pressures converge on the Alpine reservoirs: the European market, which wants water retained for the winter; Italy, which demands it in the summer for irrigating the Po Valley; and ecosystems, which require minimum flow rates. The summer of 2026 illustrated the scale of the problem: between May and July, AET’s hydroelectric production was 40–70% below average, and a study by the Polytechnic University of Milan and the CMCC ranks Switzerland among the European economies most affected by multi-year droughts. In July, Piedmont asked Ticino for more water for Lake Verbano. The State Council responded with a “maybe”: reserves were at their lowest levels, and much of the water is tied up in concessions over which the canton has no free disposal. The Lombardy Region has already linked lake navigation to the “joint management of Alpine reservoirs.” Lake Maggiore, unlike Lake Ceresio and Lake Geneva, does not have an international agreement on equal terms regarding its regulation. The Confederation intends to begin drafting such an agreement in 2027. Legal instruments Any reduction in a concession requires full compensation (Art. 43, para. 2, LUFI). Regarding international waters, the Confederation decides in consultation with the cantons concerned and takes into account the interests of the cantons from which the waters originate (Art. 76, paras. 5 and 6, Constitution). The cantons also participate in federal decision-making and in foreign policy matters affecting their interests (Art. 45 and 55 of the Constitution). The Helsinki Convention obligates riparian states to conclude agreements where none yet exist. The Proposal The study proposes a water agreement for the Ticino-Verbano-Ceresio basin, parallel to the Bilateral Agreements III and coordinated with the 2027 negotiations. The agreement should establish preventive rules for water releases in the event of drought and compensate for the water services provided by the reservoirs. It should coordinate lake levels with reservoir filling and involve water utilities and licensing authorities. Finally, it should encompass the entire Alpine system that feeds Lake Verbano, including the Italian reservoirs in the Ossola Valley, so that water releases do not place a burden solely on the Swiss side. Added to this is a cantonal strategy for storage and hydrogen, which is currently lacking even after the scaling back of the PECC. Conditions for Consent In light of the double-majority requirement, the Alpine cantons can make their consent contingent on concrete guarantees in four areas: water management across the entire basin, compensation for cross-border water services, a strategy for energy storage and hydrogen, and effective cantonal participation in shaping future developments of transposed EU law. Ticino should go to the polls with a clear agenda, not merely a “yes” or “no.”

ITEN
27 September 2026

Neutrality, Where Are You Headed?

Neutrality, Where Are You Headed? — The September 27, 2026, Vote: A Battle Won, a War Still Raging On September 27, 2026, the people and the cantons rejected the “Preservation of Swiss Neutrality” initiative with 70.15% voting “no” and not a single canton in favor. The analysis begins with the numbers. Nationally, the “yes” vote (29.85%) coincides almost exactly with the electoral weight of the sovereignist bloc (30.2%), although polls indicate shifts in both directions. Ticino is the exception: 48.25% voted “yes,” with 45 out of 100 municipalities in favor—about twenty percentage points beyond the SVP-Lega base. This is a sign of waning party loyalty and a vote judged more on the merits of the issue than on the proposer. Legally speaking, the vote does not alter the right to neutrality, codified in the Hague Conventions of 1907, but it shapes policy regarding it: by rejecting the ban, the electorate has endorsed a de facto interpretation of neutrality. For the first time, the sanctions adopted by the European Union have received popular endorsement, albeit indirectly: what was once a decision by the executive branch has become a choice—and a responsibility—of the nation. This has international implications: a practice that is more difficult to reverse, an impact on the customary law of neutrality, and good offices that depend on the consent of those who must accept them. The article then examines the outlook: the November 29 vote on military equipment, the Bilateral Agreements III and their dual-use provisions, and the rapprochement with NATO. It recalls the precedent of “differential” neutrality from the 1920s to 1938 and ETH data on the role of neutrality in shaping national identity. Each step, taken on its own, is compatible with neutrality; the issue is the sum of these steps. Finally, security. The official message is that nothing changes: neutrality will continue to be applied as it has been until now, with the goal of ensuring the country’s security. This is correct, but it is not enough. For a small neutral state, security can rest on credibility—that is, not being perceived as taking sides—or on integration into a larger defense system. A circular dynamic arises between the two, and the choice between them is a fundamental political decision that deserves to be declared as such. The author concludes that the matter is far from settled.

ITEN
22 September 2026

Administration, Not Confiscation The Nestlé Case and the Price of Belonging to a Camp for Switzerland

The criterion is not conduct; it is the list On September 17, Moscow placed Nestlé’s two Russian companies under temporary external administration, along with Auchan and other French groups—sixteen companies in all. This is not a confiscation, but the mechanism—which has been tested on Danone and Carlsberg—typically leads to a forced sale. This analysis traces the document from which everything stems: Government Order No. 430-r of March 5, 2022, reproduced here as a facsimile with an Italian translation alongside it. It is a list of twenty-two items, originally created as a technical annex to regulations governing the payment of debts to foreign creditors and later becoming the general classification system for counter-sanctions. Switzerland is listed by name, fifth from the bottom, five days after the Federal Council’s decision to adopt the European sanctions—while Italy, Germany, and France are listed by reference under the collective heading “Member States of the European Union.” This difference is not merely formal: the member states are deemed “unfriendly” by virtue of their membership, whereas Switzerland is classified as such based on an individual assessment of its conduct. The article then compares two closely related events—the Russian decree targeting a Swiss company and the inclusion, in December 2025, of Swiss citizen Jacques Baud on the European Union’s lists—and notes that Bern spoke out publicly within twenty-four hours on behalf of its multinational company, but chose to remain discreet regarding its citizen. One instrument of international law remains: the 1990 Swiss-Soviet agreement on investment protection, with its arbitration clause, to which is added—for the German partner’s share—the 1989 German-Soviet treaty. Nestlé has a forum; Baud does not have an equivalent one. The article concludes with a hypothesis: in 1972, Edward Lorenz asked whether the flapping of a butterfly’s wings in Brazil could trigger a tornado in Texas—not to argue that butterflies cause tornadoes, but because in an unstable system, the chain linking a minor cause to a massive effect is too long to be reconstructed. The decisions that expose Switzerland often have that dimension—a sanction accepted out of inertia, a discreet move preferred over a public stance—and their effect is not a targeted retaliation, but an argument handed to the opposing side. It is the price paid by those who have relinquished one legal status without acquiring another: they no longer control the chain of effects resulting from their own choices.

ITEN
17 September 2026

Has Switzerland Taken Off Its Mask? Notes on the Language of Neutrality, from 1939 to the Present

Has Switzerland Taken Off Its Mask? Notes on the Language of Neutrality, from 1939 to the Present In September 1939, on the eve of the war, the Federal Council issued its Declaration of Neutrality. The language speaks louder than many commentaries: no aggressor named, no belligerent mentioned, only an “international tension” without a subject. Neutrality is founded on the treaties of 1815, which recognize it as “corresponding to the true interests of the politics of all of Europe”—a role that Europe had assigned to Switzerland, standing above the parties. And the apparatus that supported it—the ordinance on the maintenance of neutrality of April 14, 1939, and a war economy already in place since December 1938—had been built months in advance and triggered at precisely the right moment. Not a reaction: a mechanism. I contrast these documents with the interview of the head of the Military Intelligence Service, Brigadier Stefano Trojani, who referred to the Russian government as a “regime.” Technically speaking, the term is defensible. But “regime” has a second, connotative meaning: it is reserved for those one wishes to identify as adversaries, never for partners or allies with similar traits. No Swiss official would say “the Saudi regime” or “the Egyptian regime.” The choice does not follow a coherent political science framework: it follows the prevailing political alignment of the moment. And in the broadcast report, the visual framing—the American aircraft carrier, “American military assets,” “the Western arms industry”—places Switzerland within a camp, not above the camps. Here, the correct standard of judgment is not state neutrality—which does not apply to RSI—but the requirement of relevance under Art. 4(2) of the Radio and Television Act (LRTV): opinions and comments must be recognizable as such. Much of what was broadcast is legitimate: the statement comes from an interviewee, and the Federal Supreme Court acknowledges that individual positions may be one-sided (DTF 139 II 519, which arose precisely from an examination of coverage of a referendum). But two points stand out: a characterization as a “regime” that appeared in the news broadcast without any indication that it was a value judgment; and, above all, the body of broadcasts (Art. 4, para. 4)—Süssli, Roos, Trojani, the coverage of the Baud case—which all follow the same tone, in the run-up to a vote on the issue. This is not an isolated incident: it is a trend that spans the change in leadership. The question, just a few days before the September 27 vote on the neutrality initiative, is not whether the right word was used. It is whether Switzerland still perceives its neutrality as an existential condition—or as a label to be handled casually, because we no longer feel the danger—or even—as it was in 1939.

ITEN
10 September 2026

Why “Moscow’s Target”: A Legal and Institutional Analysis

Army Chief Benedikt Roos has described Switzerland as a “target for Moscow” because it is part of the Western world. This report turns that perspective on its head: the problem is not Russian hostility in and of itself, but the fact that Switzerland no longer enjoys the protection that stemmed from its status as a neutral power. The right to neutrality, codified in the Fifth Hague Convention of 1907, rests on two obligations: not to supply war material to the belligerents (Art. 7) and to treat them impartially (Art. 9). In recent years, a series of decisions has substantially eroded that balance: the presence of Swiss-made weapons systems destined for Ukraine via indirect channels, the opening of exports to 25 countries—almost all of them Western (a legislative amendment from December 2025, suspended by a successful referendum), joining NATO’s ammunition program, the facilitation of military transit provided for in the 2026 Security Strategy, and the alignment of sanctions with those of the EU against Russia alone—for the first time against a nuclear power holding a veto right at the UN. From a formal standpoint, the Federal Council’s position is defensible: the Hague obligations apply to state-sponsored supplies, not to the private trade in military equipment, which neutrality law does not require to be prohibited. From a formal standpoint, the Federal Council’s position is defensible: the Hague obligations apply to state-sponsored supplies, not to the private trade in military equipment, which neutrality law does not require to be prohibited. The report, however, highlights the limitation of this approach: equal treatment is not measured by individual provisions, but rather by the overall effect of a system that systematically favors only one side. The report, however, highlights the limitation of this approach: equal treatment is not measured by individual provisions, but rather by the overall effect of a system that systematically favors only one side. The report acknowledges this argument but highlights its limitation: equal treatment is not measured by individual provisions, but by the overall effect of a system that systematically favors a single sector. Permanent neutrality is not a catalog of technical prohibitions, but a credible neutral stance; and it is that stance—not the letter of the articles—that provides protection. This forms the basis for the report’s response to two opposing arguments. To those who argue, along with Professor Odile Ammann, that credible neutrality serves “the common interest” and entails sanctions, the report counters that a neutrality that consistently sides with the same party is no longer equidistance but selective judgment, coinciding with that of the EU. To those who point out, along with historian Thomas Maissen, that it was not neutrality that saved us in 1939–45, the report responds that that very episode proves the point: Switzerland was spared purely out of self-interest—occupying it would have cost more than it would have yielded, with the Ridotto threatening the Alpine lines vital to the Axis. It is this very calculation that today’s alignment risks overturning: siding with one camp increases one’s value as a target without offering any protection in return, especially since an attack on a non-NATO country does not trigger Article 5 and does not oblige anyone to respond. The conclusion is that the danger Roos evokes is largely self-inflicted by a political choice: made by the Federal Council, ratified by Parliament, and, on September 27, put to the people via the neutrality initiative. If the initiative fails, responsibility for this drift will also fall on the citizens—the very same people who, according to Roos, do not perceive the danger, because they are still convinced they are protected.

ITEN
3 September 2026

Neutral, not indifferent

Risposta all’editoriale di Orazio Martinetti “Neutrali ma non ignavi” (La Regione, 27 agosto 2026), che criticava l’iniziativa Pro Svizzera come “neutralismo” ingenuo. L’articolo contesta le tesi punto per punto: la neutralità non è un’opinione morale sulla guerra ma uno statuto giuridico (Convenzioni dell’Aja 1907) fondato su doveri precisi — parità di trattamento, vigilanza armata, assistenza umanitaria imparziale — che la Svizzera ha smarrito dal 28 febbraio 2022 con l’adesione alle sanzioni UE contro la Russia. Testo apparso in forma ridotta il 2 settembre 2026 su LaRegione.

IT
23 August 2026

Common destiny or "à la carte" neutrality? Singapore and Switzerland compared

Common destiny or "à la carte" neutrality? Singapore and Switzerland compared Starting from a 1988 speech by Lee Kuan Yew — at once a warning and a founding act of Singapore's national narrative — this analysis builds a systematic comparison between two exposed small states at opposite ends of the world, Singapore and Switzerland. It is the distance between them, rather than any presumed similarity, that makes the exercise fruitful: it allows one to separate what is structurally necessary to a small state's survival from what is merely contingent or the product of political choice. The comparison unfolds on several planes. On the side of convergence: the centrality of institutional continuity; the doctrine of vulnerability elevated into a founding identity; the strategic management of national reserves (sovereign wealth funds and secrecy in Singapore, National Bank reserves in Switzerland); "porcupine" defence, built on a militia army and universal conscription; and the shared condition of multilingual and multi-faith societies, in which cohesion must be manufactured rather than inherited. On the side of divergence in method: Singapore's social engineering from above — rigorous meritocracy, a top civil service paid on a par with the private sector, ethnic quotas imposed in public housing, English as a neutral working language — set against the Swiss model of militia service, territorial autonomy and parity among the national languages. The central question is neutrality. In principle, Bern and the city-state diverge radically: one neutral by identity, the other openly non-aligned. Yet on the concrete ground of security policy the distance narrows almost to nothing: de facto alignment with Western defence architecture, the same weapons systems, sanctions on Russia adopted by breaking with long-standing practice. The analysis also examines the legal nature of Swiss neutrality — defined by no statute, managed "à la carte" by the executive — and the debate opened by the Neutrality Initiative, put to the vote on 27 September 2026. The result is a paradox: for an exposed small state, the legal label matters far less than the material logic of survival. Neutrality thus proves to be less a condition of law than a mode of risk management. A postscript carries the reflection to its conclusion: since neutrality is an inherently war-related institution and Switzerland’s geographical exposure to a great-power conflict is far sharper than Singapore’s, the Confederation is eroding the very instrument its position makes most necessary — and its convergence with the city-state proves, on closer view, less reassuring than it appears.

IT DE FREN
17 August 2026

Swiss law on neutrality — II: possible developments following the adoption of the constitutional amendment of 27 September

Whilst the first volume provided an overview of the existing law, this second volume takes the next step: it attempts to project it into the future. Having examined the current regulatory framework and the way in which the Government and Parliament relate to it, the study simulates what might happen if the initiative on neutrality were to be accepted on 27 September 2026. It is not, therefore, a prediction, but a reasoned simulation, based on the findings of the first volume and available historical precedents. The starting point is the constituent power of the popular initiative, illustrated through two contrasting precedents: the Lex Weber of 2012, which was unexpectedly accepted and implemented with disruptive speed; and the 2014 initiative on mass immigration, the implementation of which was stalled for years by European obligations, until a compromise was reached that effectively gutted its scope. These are the two models — one swift, the other contentious — against which to assess the possible effects of the new Article 54a. The study then reviews, in perspective, the themes of the first volume, and addresses some specific chapters: the effect of the shift from flexible to rigid neutrality on humanitarian credibility and the role of the ICRC; the consequences for the financial centre in the face of Western sanctions regimes; the review of sanctions that SECO is expected to conduct, including the fate of the approximately 7.4 billion in frozen assets and the likely shift in the authority’s remit, from monitoring sanctioned entities to monitoring financial flows; Switzerland’s autonomous countermeasures and, conversely, those that Western partners might adopt in response to a Swiss deviation. A chapter of particular interest concerns justiciability: constitutionalised neutrality enshrined in a specific prohibition could — following the model of the Lex Weber, which the Federal Supreme Court declared directly applicable — transform neutrality from an unchallengeable act of government into a test of legality that can be invoked, indirectly, by those affected by it. Such judicial review simply does not exist today, given that acts of foreign policy are not subject to judicial review. The study does not isolate the issue from its context. It highlights the two key issues driving the debate in recent weeks: the security argument, raised by opponents of the initiative, according to which rigid neutrality would weaken defence cooperation at precisely the moment when the European context is becoming unstable; and the convergence with the parallel ‘Bussola’ initiative, which addresses the same issue of the dynamic transposition of European law. Both neutrality and the Bilateral Agreements III, ultimately, revolve around the same question: how much sovereignty Switzerland is prepared to cede. Finally, the study examines the scenario of a rejection of the initiative and the more serious scenario of an open conflict between Russia and the Confederation’s Western partners. The overarching theme of the conclusions is that what is truly at stake on 27 September is not the choice between having or not having neutrality — Switzerland will remain neutral in either case — but rather the choice between two ways of being neutral: a flexible neutrality, which preserves the political scope to align itself selectively, and a rigid neutrality, which sacrifices that scope in exchange for a predefined and consistent position. A choice which, as demonstrated by the Bilateral Agreements III issue and the ‘Compass’ initiative, is merely the first step in a broader redefinition of the relationship between sovereignty, direct democracy and European integration.

IT DE FREN
11 August 2026

Chi ha davvero interesse a parlare di «disinformazione russa»

Scheda di sintesi — «Chi ha davvero interesse a parlare di «disinformazione russa»?» Analisi indipendente di Niccolò Salvioni, 11 agosto 2026. Voto federale del 27 settembre sull'iniziativa per una neutralità «permanente e armata» (nuovo art. 54a Cost.). Documento di lavoro interno: mappa completa dell'articolo, sezione per sezione. Tesi e taglio Analisi che non prende posizione per il Sì o per il No: isola il meccanismo comunicativo con cui entrambi i fronti sostituiscono l'argomento con il sospetto, e riporta il dibattito sul merito costituzionale. La simmetria isolata è di metodo comunicativo, non di solidità istituzionale — che resta invece asimmetrica (v. sotto). 1. Il meccanismo: sospetto al posto dell'argomento Il comitato del Sì (UDC, Pro Svizzera) evita il tema che ha originato l'iniziativa — la guerra in Ucraina, «l'elefante nella stanza». Il fronte del No la bolla come «Pro-Putin-Initiative». Un testo che non nomina alcuno Stato viene tradotto in un giudizio di lealtà. Slogan dei due fronti: «Kein Krieg» (Sì) contro «gioco di Putin» / «Pas d'affaires sanglantes avec Poutine» (No). Nessuno dei due schieramenti è compatto come gli slogan suggeriscono. 2. La sostanza: art. 1 LEmb, veto ONU, portata L'art. 1 della Legge sugli embarghi (dal 2003) consente sanzioni su base ONU, OSCE o dei principali partner commerciali (l'UE). L'iniziativa vorrebbe indirettamente abrogare questa facoltà, limitando la Svizzera alle sole misure ONU — dove la Russia ha il veto: un regime «solo ONU» non avrebbe mai potuto colpire Mosca. Recidere la clausola toglierebbe due ancoraggi (partner commerciali e OSCE), non uno. Portata oltre l'Ucraina: sanzioni verso RDC, Haiti, Libia, Sudan, e -forse- Venezuela. 3. Memoria storica usata a rovescio La memoria della Commissione Bergier (oro Reichsbank, timbro «J», politica dei rifugiati) è arruolata con segno opposto: Zakharova (31 luglio) la usa per dire che Berna si è «solo spostata di bersaglio» — da Berlino a Kiev/Bruxelles; Blocher la usa citando il 1938 come modello di «neutralità integrale» da recuperare. Stesse fonti, direzioni politiche opposte. Il parallelo Svizzera-Germania nazista/UE si spezza dove conta: differenza categorica, non di grado — nessuna fonte formula l'equivalenza; è continuità di metodo (neutralità come prassi negoziata col potere dominante), non equivalenza morale. 4. L'asimmetria istituzionale (argomento centrale) Fronte del No: interpartitico — conferenza stampa comune 17 agosto di PLR, Centro, Verdi liberali, PS, Verdi (inclusa la ticinese Greta Gysin), coerente col voto delle Camere che avevano respinto l'iniziativa. Vi si aggiunge il Consiglio federale: Cassis avverte oggi che l'iniziativa «indebolirebbe la Svizzera». Fronte del Sì: sostanzialmente monopartitico (solo l'UDC tra i grandi partiti). Alla conferenza di lancio (4 agosto) la guerra in Ucraina è stata trattata come «l'elefante nella stanza» — perché i sondaggi mostrano ampio sostegno alle sanzioni (64% le ritiene compatibili con la neutralità; sostegno 77% nel 2022, 71% nel 2026). 5. Sondaggi elettorali (quadro aperto) YouGov (fine luglio): Sì 40 / No 38, indecisi 22%. Leewas (fine giugno, per Tamedia/20 Minuten): No 54 / Sì 34. La divergenza segnala esito non deciso. 6. Il precedente Venezuela 3 gennaio 2026: operazione militare USA unilaterale in Venezuela, senza mandato ONU, con cattura di Maduro. 48 ore dopo il Consiglio federale blocca i beni svizzeri di Maduro e di altre 35 persone, con la legge sui valori patrimoniali di provenienza illecita (strumento distinto dalla LEmb, ma stessa discrezionalità). Nessun allarme sulla neutralità: prova che l'obiezione «neutralità» è applicata selettivamente. 7. Il «contrappeso involontario» (Jorio) Lo storico Marco Jorio, intervistato dal Der Bund nello stesso pezzo che descrive l'iniziativa come «dirottata» da Russia Today, definisce «esagerazione smisurata» (masslose Übertreibung) la tesi di un nesso stretto tra neutralità svizzera e interessi russi. La fonte scelta dal giornale per legittimare la tesi la corregge al ribasso. 8. Doppio standard sull'«ingerenza» La voce russa da RT (propaganda esplicita) è segnalata come disinformazione; la stessa voce da una portavoce ministeriale (Zakharova) è ospitata per intero dalla NZZ (6 agosto) quasi senza filtro. Per contro, due voci tedesche contro l'iniziativa non producono titoli su «ingerenza»: Constanze Stelzenmüller (Brookings, giurista tedesca) testimonia alla Commissione degli Stati (audizione 20 gennaio 2025); l'ambasciatore Markus Potzel critica in un'intervista NZZ (27 gennaio 2026) l'allentamento dell'export di armi. L'etichetta «disinformazione» è applicata a doppio standard secondo chi parla. 9. Il caso Baud e il debanking Jacques Baud (cittadino svizzero, ex colonnello) inserito il 15 dicembre 2025 nella lista UE (Decisione PESC 2025/2572) come «portavoce della propaganda filorussa», senza processo. La Svizzera non ha recepito la sanzione. Il 22 febbraio 2026 UBS blocca conti e carte senza obbligo giuridico svizzero (la SECO ricorda che le banche possono farlo autonomamente); UBS non ha reso note le motivazioni. Debanking preventivo, onere della prova rovesciato. Profili di diritti fondamentali: sul piano della sanzione UE, precedenti di Strasburgo sull'accesso a un giudice (Al-Dulimi c. Svizzera 2016; Nada c. Svizzera 2012, per libertà di movimento e vita privata); il gesto della banca privata resta fuori dalla Convenzione e va misurato sul diritto svizzero della personalità. Rinvio a un possibile futuro pezzo sulla piazza finanziaria (risoluzioni forzate di conti quadruplicate 2019-2024). 10. Dimensione ticinese Fronte del Sì ticinese (UDC + Lega) formalmente compatto ma organizzativamente indebolito. Voti di minoranza di Chiesa (agli Stati) e Quadri (al Nazionale). Crisi Lega: il consigliere di Stato Claudio Zali — inchiesta penale del Ministero pubblico per abuso di autorità e tentata coazione (distinta dagli audio), presunzione d'innocenza — si dimette dal 30 settembre, tre giorni dopo il voto; il seggio va all'UDC Marchesi. Il nesso tra crisi Zali e disimpegno leghista è ipotesi analitica, non fatto accertato. Il Gran Consiglio non ha ruolo formale (iniziativa federale). Conclusione dell'articolo Il modo più efficace per neutralizzare un'iniziativa costituzionale scomoda non è confutarla nel merito, ma renderla sospetta per associazione — uso asimmetrico dell'etichetta «disinformazione», memoria storica arruolata a rovescio, slogan che riducono un dibattito sulla discrezionalità del Consiglio federale a un test di lealtà, partiti non compatti. Il rischio: un serio dibattito costituzionale di merito sulla neutralità scompare dietro tutto questo.

IT
8 February 2026

Swiss Neutrality in a Bind: Protector Powers, Atlantic Alignment, and the Paradox of Self-Created Security

** **Neutrality Trapped: The Security Switzerland Built for Itself** Historical-political synthesis of the essay "Swiss Neutrality Trapped: Protecting Powers, Atlantic Alignment and the Paradox of Self-Made Security" (Niccolò Salvioni, 8 February 2026) On 27 January 2026, Federal Councillor Martin Pfister asked Swiss citizens for a permanent 0.8-point increase in VAT — 31 billion francs over ten years — because the Confederation "would no longer be able to defend itself alone." Read against the grain, the announcement reveals a historical paradox of the first order: much of the threat citizens are now being asked to pay for stems from political choices made by the Federal Council itself starting in 2022, when Bern decided to join the European Union's sanctions against Russia, effectively abandoning — though never formally declaring so — two centuries of armed neutrality. Moscow reacted by immediately placing Switzerland on its list of "hostile countries." The bill for that political shift, never put to a referendum, is now being presented to taxpayers as a consumption tax. **From Vienna 1815 to today: a neutrality constantly reinterpreted** Swiss neutrality was born as an institution of international law at the Congress of Vienna in May 1815 and was ratified by the Treaty of Paris of 20 November of that same year, when Russia, England, Prussia, Austria and France recognized the Confederation's "perpetual" neutrality, declaring that its inviolability was "in the interest of the whole of Europe." Since then, doctrine has distinguished five defining traits: voluntary, permanent, armed, internationally recognized, and active (oriented toward good offices and humanitarian aid). In practice, however, Swiss neutrality has never been a rigid bloc, but a principle constantly renegotiated with history: - **First World War (1914-1918):** integral neutrality, defended through mobilizations of up to 450,000 men, yet crossed by strong internal linguistic tensions between opposing sympathies for the Central Powers and the Entente. - **Second World War (1939-1945):** the peak of military credibility — the "Alpine Redoubt" strategy made invasion too costly for the Wehrmacht — but also the lowest point on moral and economic grounds, with Swiss arms manufacturers (Bührle chief among them) supplying the Reich and the National Bank purchasing German gold of uncertain origin, while Jewish refugees were turned back at the border. - **Cold War (1945-1989):** Federal Councillor Max Petitpierre's formula, "neutrality and solidarity" (1953), describes a Switzerland formally equidistant yet culturally and economically anchored to the West. - **From 1990 to today:** the Confederation accepts UN sanctions (Gulf War, 1991), joins NATO's Partnership for Peace (1996), and sends unarmed contingents to Kosovo (1999). But the turning point of 28 February 2022 — joining EU sanctions against Russia — is of a different nature: for the first time since 1815, Switzerland took sides in a conflict between great powers without a universal UN mandate, and did so by autonomous choice, not out of membership obligation as was the case for Ireland or Austria, which are bound by the EU's common foreign policy. **The silent collapse of the protecting powers** Less well known to the general public, but central to the essay, is the trajectory of the protecting-power institution: the neutral state that, on a belligerent's mandate, represents its interests before another state with which diplomatic relations have been severed — a function codified by the 1949 Geneva Conventions, of which Switzerland is the depositary. During the Second World War, Bern administered 219 such mandates, the absolute peak of its diplomatic influence. Today only eight remain. The best known — representing American interests in Iran since 1980, in the aftermath of the hostage crisis — is also the most emblematic of the current paradox: Switzerland represents Washington in Tehran while simultaneously applying sanctions against Iran under Western pressure, a structural conflict of interest that Tehran cannot help but perceive as taking sides rather than as equidistance. The same mechanism has reproduced itself, on a larger scale, with Switzerland's adoption of anti-Russian sanctions: a reciprocal protecting-power mandate between Bern and Moscow, on the model of the one activated after the 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict, is today politically unthinkable. Sweden and Finland, which during the Second World War administered 114 and several mandates of their own respectively, closed the circle by formally joining NATO in 2023-2024, acknowledging the abandonment of neutrality. Switzerland, by contrast, remains in a hybrid position: too aligned to be believed impartial, too formally neutral to enjoy the guarantees of collective defense. **An army that can't spend: the 19-billion-franc bill** The paradox of "self-made security" also has a distinctly managerial face. A parliamentary commission certified, at the end of 2024, that seven military and IT projects of the Department of Defense — worth a combined 19 billion francs — present "serious problems and major risks": cost overruns on the F-35A fighter jets (up to 1.8 billion francs), the Israeli ADS-15 drones running seven years behind schedule, the ground-to-air defense system suspended since 2016 with no replacement, the FIS Heer IT system that collapsed after nearly a billion francs invested, and mobile military telecommunications delayed by years. No executive has been removed, no political responsibility taken. The international comparison, the essay explains, shows that the only way to reconcile armed neutrality with industrial credibility is the Swedish model — Saab and the Gripen fighter — which, however, costs nearly five times what Switzerland currently spends as a share of GDP (0.72% versus the 3.5% Sweden is moving toward). Over 80% of Switzerland's recent military procurement now comes from a single country, the United States, or its close allies such as Israel: the exact opposite of the industrial autonomy that the June 2025 Armaments Policy Strategy itself claims to pursue. **Who pays the bill: the regressivity of VAT** The VAT increase proposed to finance rearmament — from 8.1% to 8.9%, aimed at bringing military spending back to 1% of GDP by 2032, against a current 0.72% and a 1960-2024 historical average of 1.43% — is, by its very nature, a fiscally regressive choice: it disproportionately hits those who spend nearly all of their income on consumption (low-income families, pensioners on fixed incomes) compared with those able to save or invest a substantial share of their earnings. According to the estimates cited in the essay, a family with an annual income of 30,000 francs would face an added burden equal to 0.72% of its income, against 0.60% for a family with median income. The Federal Council could have chosen progressive instruments instead — a higher marginal rate on federal direct tax above 250,000 francs, or an extraordinary levy on the profits of multinationals benefiting from the November 2025 deal with the Trump administration (200 billion dollars in investment committed to the United States) — but did not: none of these alternatives has ever been publicly discussed. **Horizon Europe and Bilaterals III: neutrality mortgaged** An entire chapter of the essay is devoted to a little-discussed contradiction: starting in July 2025, the European Commission opened the Horizon Europe research program (2028-2034, budget nearly doubled to €175 billion) — for the first time in over forty years — to dual-use projects, meaning those with both civilian and military applications: drones, artificial intelligence for weapons systems, quantum technologies, satellite surveillance. Through the Bilaterals III package and the EU Programmes Agreement (EUPA), in force since 1 January 2025, Switzerland participates as an "associated country," contributing hundreds of millions of francs a year with no safeguard clause, no opt-out right, and no independent audit over how the funded technologies are ultimately used. Article 4 of the EUPA requires the dynamic adoption of all future EU program rules: the only way out would be to denounce the entire agreement. On top of this comes the infrastructural integration foreseen by Bilaterals III in energy (ENTSO-E) and transport, which in the event of a conflict between the EU and a third state would force the Confederation into discriminatory choices toward one of the belligerents — an automatic violation of the equal-treatment principle enshrined in the 1907 Hague Conventions, and with it, effectively, the end of the very possibility of remaining neutral in the legal sense. **From equidistance to economic subordination** The picture is completed by the November 2025 trade deal with the Trump administration — 200 billion dollars in Swiss private investment committed to the United States by 2028 — and by a symptomatic episode of the current political climate: in January 2026 the municipality of Muralto revoked authorization for a screening of the documentary "Maidan: The Road to War," organized by the Ticino chapter of the Friends of the Constitution, a case of preventive censorship that the essay places within the same trajectory of rhetorical and political alignment with the Atlantic bloc. **Open questions for citizens** The essay closes with a constitutional reading: Article 185 of the Federal Constitution charges the Federal Council with "safeguarding neutrality," yet the decision to join sanctions against Russia was never ratified by Parliament on an ordinary legal basis, and Bilaterals III is headed only for an optional referendum, not the mandatory one required under Article 140 for treaties involving supranational integration. A signature drive is currently underway, the author notes, for an initiative that would enshrine in the Constitution a mandatory double-majority referendum requirement for this type of agreement. In its final chapter — an afterword devoted to twenty-first-century threat scenarios — the essay judges a conventional invasion of Swiss territory to be extremely unlikely, while rating the probability of hybrid threats — cyberattacks, disinformation, economic pressure — as high, threats against which F-35 jets and armored systems are largely useless. Its conclusion is that, among the four available paths — a full return to armed neutrality on the 1960-1990 model, explicit Atlantic integration through NATO membership, a "Irish-style" light neutrality, or a reinforced light neutrality that selectively retains elements of the classic model (mandatory military service, strategic reserves, cyber-defense) — the latter offers the best balance between cost, effectiveness against real threats, and compatibility with public values, provided, however, that Switzerland forgoes precisely those Bilaterals III commitments which, by integrating it into Europe's energy, digital and research structures, would in any case leave that same autonomy only partial. What remains, as the author's closing note, is a question no official document has yet put directly to citizens: what kind of Switzerland do we want for the twenty-first century — neutral and coherent, allied and declared, or still trapped in a hybrid that has so far accumulated the costs of every option without the benefits of any? Niccolò Salvioni, Locarno Neutrality Trapped: The Security Switzerland Built for Itself -political synthesis of the essay "Swiss Neutrality Trapped: Protecting Powers, Atlantic Alignment and the Paradox of Self-Made Security" (Niccolò Salvioni, 8 February 2026) On 27 January 2026, Federal Councillor Martin Pfister asked Swiss citizens for a permanent 0.8-point increase in VAT — 31 billion francs over ten years — because the Confederation "would no longer be able to defend itself alone." Read against the grain, the announcement reveals a historical paradox of the first order: much of the threat citizens are now being asked to pay for stems from political choices made by the Federal Council itself starting in 2022, when Bern decided to join the European Union's sanctions against Russia, effectively abandoning — though never formally declaring so — two centuries of armed neutrality. Moscow reacted by immediately placing Switzerland on its list of "hostile countries." The bill for that political shift, never put to a referendum, is now being presented to taxpayers as a consumption tax. From Vienna 1815 to today: a neutrality constantly reinterpreted Swiss neutrality was born as an institution of international law at the Congress of Vienna in May 1815 and was ratified by the Treaty of Paris of 20 November of that same year, when Russia, England, Prussia, Austria and France recognized the Confederation's "perpetual" neutrality, declaring that its inviolability was "in the interest of the whole of Europe." Since then, doctrine has distinguished five defining traits: voluntary, permanent, armed, internationally recognized, and active (oriented toward good offices and humanitarian aid). In practice, however, Swiss neutrality has never been a rigid bloc, but a principle constantly renegotiated with history: - First World War (1914-1918): integral neutrality, defended through mobilizations of up to 450,000 men, yet crossed by strong internal linguistic tensions between opposing sympathies for the Central Powers and the Entente. - Second World War (1939-1945): the peak of military credibility — the "Alpine Redoubt" strategy made invasion too costly for the Wehrmacht — but also the lowest point on moral and economic grounds, with Swiss arms manufacturers (Bührle chief among them) supplying the Reich and the National Bank purchasing German gold of uncertain origin, while Jewish refugees were turned back at the border. - Cold War (1945-1989): Federal Councillor Max Petitpierre's formula, "neutrality and solidarity" (1953), describes a Switzerland formally equidistant yet culturally and economically anchored to the West. - From 1990 to today: the Confederation accepts UN sanctions (Gulf War, 1991), joins NATO's Partnership for Peace (1996), and sends unarmed contingents to Kosovo (1999). But the turning point of 28 February 2022 — joining EU sanctions against Russia — is of a different nature: for the first time since 1815, Switzerland took sides in a conflict between great powers without a universal UN mandate, and did so by autonomous choice, not out of membership obligation as was the case for Ireland or Austria, which are bound by the EU's common foreign policy. The silent collapse of the protecting powers Less well known to the general public, but central to the essay, is the trajectory of the protecting-power institution: the neutral state that, on a belligerent's mandate, represents its interests before another state with which diplomatic relations have been severed — a function codified by the 1949 Geneva Conventions, of which Switzerland is the depositary. During the Second World War, Bern administered 219 such mandates, the absolute peak of its diplomatic influence. Today only eight remain. The best known — representing American interests in Iran since 1980, in the aftermath of the hostage crisis — is also the most emblematic of the current paradox: Switzerland represents Washington in Tehran while simultaneously applying sanctions against Iran under Western pressure, a structural conflict of interest that Tehran cannot help but perceive as taking sides rather than as equidistance. The same mechanism has reproduced itself, on a larger scale, with Switzerland's adoption of anti-Russian sanctions: a reciprocal protecting-power mandate between Bern and Moscow, on the model of the one activated after the 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict, is today politically unthinkable. Sweden and Finland, which during the Second World War administered 114 and several mandates of their own respectively, closed the circle by formally joining NATO in 2023-2024, acknowledging the abandonment of neutrality. Switzerland, by contrast, remains in a hybrid position: too aligned to be believed impartial, too formally neutral to enjoy the guarantees of collective defense. An army that can't spend: the 19-billion-franc bill The paradox of "self-made security" also has a distinctly managerial face. A parliamentary commission certified, at the end of 2024, that seven military and IT projects of the Department of Defense — worth a combined 19 billion francs — present "serious problems and major risks": cost overruns on the F-35A fighter jets (up to 1.8 billion francs), the Israeli ADS-15 drones running seven years behind schedule, the ground-to-air defense system suspended since 2016 with no replacement, the FIS Heer IT system that collapsed after nearly a billion francs invested, and mobile military telecommunications delayed by years. No executive has been removed, no political responsibility taken. The international comparison, the essay explains, shows that the only way to reconcile armed neutrality with industrial credibility is the Swedish model — Saab and the Gripen fighter — which, however, costs nearly five times what Switzerland currently spends as a share of GDP (0.72% versus the 3.5% Sweden is moving toward). Over 80% of Switzerland's recent military procurement now comes from a single country, the United States, or its close allies such as Israel: the exact opposite of the industrial autonomy that the June 2025 Armaments Policy Strategy itself claims to pursue. Who pays the bill: the regressivity of VAT The VAT increase proposed to finance rearmament — from 8.1% to 8.9%, aimed at bringing military spending back to 1% of GDP by 2032, against a current 0.72% and a 1960-2024 historical average of 1.43% — is, by its very nature, a fiscally regressive choice: it disproportionately hits those who spend nearly all of their income on consumption (low-income families, pensioners on fixed incomes) compared with those able to save or invest a substantial share of their earnings. According to the estimates cited in the essay, a family with an annual income of 30,000 francs would face an added burden equal to 0.72% of its income, against 0.60% for a family with median income. The Federal Council could have chosen progressive instruments instead — a higher marginal rate on federal direct tax above 250,000 francs, or an extraordinary levy on the profits of multinationals benefiting from the November 2025 deal with the Trump administration (200 billion dollars in investment committed to the United States) — but did not: none of these alternatives has ever been publicly discussed. Horizon Europe and Bilaterals III: neutrality mortgaged An entire chapter of the essay is devoted to a little-discussed contradiction: starting in July 2025, the European Commission opened the Horizon Europe research program (2028-2034, budget nearly doubled to €175 billion) — for the first time in over forty years — to dual-use projects, meaning those with both civilian and military applications: drones, artificial intelligence for weapons systems, quantum technologies, satellite surveillance. Through the Bilaterals III package and the EU Programmes Agreement (EUPA), in force since 1 January 2025, Switzerland participates as an "associated country," contributing hundreds of millions of francs a year with no safeguard clause, no opt-out right, and no independent audit over how the funded technologies are ultimately used. Article 4 of the EUPA requires the dynamic adoption of all future EU program rules: the only way out would be to denounce the entire agreement. On top of this comes the infrastructural integration foreseen by Bilaterals III in energy (ENTSO-E) and transport, which in the event of a conflict between the EU and a third state would force the Confederation into discriminatory choices toward one of the belligerents — an automatic violation of the equal-treatment principle enshrined in the 1907 Hague Conventions, and with it, effectively, the end of the very possibility of remaining neutral in the legal sense. From equidistance to economic subordination The picture is completed by the November 2025 trade deal with the Trump administration — 200 billion dollars in Swiss private investment committed to the United States by 2028 — and by a symptomatic episode of the current political climate: in January 2026 the municipality of Muralto revoked authorization for a screening of the documentary "Maidan: The Road to War," organized by the Ticino chapter of the Friends of the Constitution, a case of preventive censorship that the essay places within the same trajectory of rhetorical and political alignment with the Atlantic bloc. Open questions for citizens The essay closes with a constitutional reading: Article 185 of the Federal Constitution charges the Federal Council with "safeguarding neutrality," yet the decision to join sanctions against Russia was never ratified by Parliament on an ordinary legal basis, and Bilaterals III is headed only for an optional referendum, not the mandatory one required under Article 140 for treaties involving supranational integration. A signature drive is currently underway, the author notes, for an initiative that would enshrine in the Constitution a mandatory double-majority referendum requirement for this type of agreement. In its final chapter — an afterword devoted to twenty-first-century threat scenarios — the essay judges a conventional invasion of Swiss territory to be extremely unlikely, while rating the probability of hybrid threats — cyberattacks, disinformation, economic pressure — as high, threats against which F-35 jets and armored systems are largely useless. Its conclusion is that, among the four available paths — a full return to armed neutrality on the 1960-1990 model, explicit Atlantic integration through NATO membership, a "Irish-style" light neutrality, or a reinforced light neutrality that selectively retains elements of the classic model (mandatory military service, strategic reserves, cyber-defense) — the latter offers the best balance between cost, effectiveness against real threats, and compatibility with public values, provided, however, that Switzerland forgoes precisely those Bilaterals III commitments which, by integrating it into Europe's energy, digital and research structures, would in any case leave that same autonomy only partial. What remains, as the author's closing note, is a question no official document has yet put directly to citizens: what kind of Switzerland do we want for the twenty-first century — neutral and coherent, allied and declared, or still trapped in a hybrid that has so far accumulated the costs of every option without the benefits of any? Niccolò Salvioni, Locarno

ITEN
20 January 2026

Bilateral Agreements III: Switzerland–EU—Institutional Issues and Their Implications

Bilateral Agreements III CH–EU: Institutional Questions and Their Ramifications Contextualization Outline of the address delivered in Mendrisio (the Filanda) on 17 January 2026, at the conference on Bilaterals III organized by the NO EU, NO NATO group. Niccolò Salvioni's talk opened the proceedings by setting out the underlying institutional coordinates, followed by contributions from Graziano Pestoni (the electricity agreement), Leonardo Schmidt (free movement of persons), and Alberto Togni (EU–NATO relations and neutrality). The text was reworked and expanded after the conference, with subsequent additions on cybersecurity and the European informational dimension. Published on 20 January 2026. Annotated Table of Contents Preamble — The mandate of the address: four constitutional questions the Federal Council avoided across the 896 pages of the explanatory report (13 June 2025). Block 1 — The numerical scope. The amplifying effect: 1–1.5% of the EU acquis translates into 12–16% of Swiss federal legislation, with cantonal (14–18 Ticino laws) and municipal ramifications. Block 2 — The transformation of the system. From the static model of Bilaterals I–II (1999–2021) to binding dynamic adoption (from 2025); the anomalous speed of negotiations (197 meetings in 9 months versus the 7 years of Bilaterals I). Block 3 — The six critical institutional pillars. Binding CJEU jurisdiction; decision shaping (participation without representation, contrasting the Norwegian veto under Art. 102 EEA with Switzerland's "illusory deferral"); cross-retaliation measures; the asymmetry of immunity of EU officials; Switzerland's hybrid status as a "microstate"; the marginalization of Parliament and the people. Block 4 — The civil-military dual-use dimension. The Federal Council's silence on the strategic-military dimension; the mid-term reform of EU cohesion policy (COM(2025) 163, objective RSO 3.3); the excursuses on Switzerland–EU–NATO cyber cooperation and on the threat to Swiss media independence (DSA, EMFA, Digital Europe Programme); the critical agreements (energy, land transport, air transport); neutrality from commercial freedom to infrastructural constraint, with the historical precedents of the Gotthard 1914–1918 and Switzerland 1939–1945. Block 5 — The chronological paradox. The coincidence between the launch of the "package" (23 February 2022) and the invasion of Ukraine (24 February); the adoption of sanctions within four days; the hypothetical "Summer 2028" war scenario. Block 6 — GDP impact and irreversibility. 40% of federal GDP involved; the cohesion contribution (over CHF 3 billion, 2030–2036); strategic irreversibility. Block 7 — Federalism and the equality of the cantons (Arts. 3, 43, 46 of the Constitution). The asymmetry of impact between border cantons (Ticino, 60% of GDP) and inland cantons (15%), with the republican paradox of majority voting. Conclusion — The four unanswered questions: mandatory referendum (Art. 140), compatibility with neutrality, strategic irreversibility, federalist compatibility. Synthesis The paper examines Bilaterals III not from the economic or sectoral standpoint, but from the institutional and constitutional one. Its central thesis is that the shift from a static system to one of binding dynamic adoption transforms between 12 and 16% of federal legislation, subjects disputes to the binding jurisdiction of the CJEU, and introduces cross-retaliation between agreements—thereby constituting, though without declaring it, an accession to a supranational community that ought to trigger the mandatory referendum under Art. 140 of the Constitution. The author develops two particularly original strands. The first is the comparison with Norway and the United Kingdom: both states, though NATO members or bound to the EU by defence partnerships, retain greater legislative sovereignty than "neutral" Switzerland, which accepts infrastructural constraints comparable to those of an Atlantic ally without possessing either the Norwegian veto (Art. 102 EEA) or the British capacity to refuse automatic commitments. From this follows the "triangular paradox" of a neutrality that is neutral only de jure while amounting to a de facto alignment. The second strand is the dual-use gap: across the report's 896 pages there is no analysis whatsoever of the compatibility between the integration of critical infrastructure (energy via ENTSO-E/ACER, the Alpine corridors, airspace) and the neutrality obligations of the 1907 Hague Conventions. Drawing on the Gotthard precedents, the author argues that neutrality does not prohibit trade but requires sovereign control over strategic infrastructure—control that binding integration compromises. To this is added the extension of the problem into the informational sphere, with the risk of a "soft external steering" of public-service media through the DSA, the EMFA, and co-financed algorithms. The analysis closes with the federalist question: the asymmetric impact across cantons (up to 60% of Ticino's GDP against 15% for the inland cantons) receives no consideration in the report, even though the referendum vote assigns equal weight to cantons with radically different exposure. The concluding message, addressed to Ticino, claims as a minimum republican guarantee the mandatory referendum for decisions that alter 60% of the cantonal economy.

ITEN
12 January 2026

the crucial role and unfulfilled responsibilities of public service media in shaping democratic opinion

Media di servizio pubblico e democrazia: perché l'8 marzo 2026 non si vota su 135 franchi Sintesi del saggio di Niccolò Salvioni (12 gennaio 2026) Il saggio muove da una tesi centrale: l'iniziativa "200 franchi bastano!", in votazione l'8 marzo 2026, non riguarda un risparmio di 135 franchi all'anno, ma la tenuta stessa dell'infrastruttura informativa su cui poggia la democrazia diretta svizzera. La riduzione del canone da 335 a 200 franchi è letta non come misura di risparmio, ma come smantellamento economico mascherato. Il punto di partenza è un precedente ticinese. Le votazioni cantonali del 24 novembre 2025 sulle casse malati hanno approvato — contro il parere di tutti i partiti principali, degli esperti e del Consiglio di Stato — due iniziative con maggioranze del 65,5% e 69,4%. Salvioni vi legge il modello del "voto emotivo": decisioni complesse prese come reazione al disagio economico, senza valutazione delle conseguenze né alcun piano B. È lo stesso schema psicologico e politico, sostiene, che minaccia il voto sulla SSR. Il cuore analitico è il calcolo dell'ammanco. Con il canone a 200 franchi, gli introiti Serafe scenderebbero da 1.387 a circa 828 milioni annui (−40,3%); la quota SSR passerebbe da 1.290 a circa 712 milioni, con un buco di 578 milioni — il 37% del bilancio SSR 2024. Il saggio demolisce l'illusione del "Piano B" federale: il testo dell'iniziativa fissa il canone in Costituzione (art. 93 cpv. 6), per cui ogni integrazione richiederebbe una nuova modifica costituzionale; e in un contesto di tagli federali per 5 miliardi entro il 2027, stanziare mezzo miliardo permanente è irrealistico. A sostegno, il precedente francese: l'abolizione del canone nel 2022 promessa da Macron non ha ancora trovato una compensazione stabile per i 3,2 miliardi mancanti. Segue la dimostrazione dell'insostituibilità della RSI per la Svizzera italiana. Il sistema di perequazione trasferisce circa 370 milioni dalla Svizzera tedesca alle regioni periferiche: è l'unico meccanismo che garantisce informazione di qualità nella lingua minoritaria. Nessun operatore privato ticinese può colmare quel vuoto — TeleTicino opera con 10-12 milioni contro i 140 della RSI, 40-50 dipendenti contro 640, senza corrispondenti a Berna né copertura internazionale; sommando tutti i media locali non si raggiunge il 30% delle capacità RSI. Da qui il paradosso delle radio locali, danneggiate anch'esse dal taglio, e il rischio di un "doppio impoverimento". Il saggio affronta poi il versante critico, con equidistanza: attraverso i casi Baud, Yamb, del Tribunale Speciale e la copertura delle sanzioni UE, mostra i limiti della RSI — cronaca senza contesto costituzionale, una "neutralità selettiva" che rischia di trasformarsi in allineamento narrativo. Ma la conclusione ne rovescia il senso: il problema non è quanto paghiamo, bensì quanto controllo democratico esercitiamo. La risposta non è ridurre il finanziamento, ma rafforzare la vigilanza. L'iniziativa, argomenta Salvioni, mette a rischio simultaneamente i tre pilastri della Confederazione: la democrazia diretta informata, il federalismo paritario e la coesione nazionale nel pluralismo. La scelta dell'8 marzo non è tra "SSR perfetta" e "SSR riformata", ma tra smantellare l'ecosistema informativo o preservarlo rafforzandone i controlli. La vera infrastruttura critica del Paese non sono solo strade, ferrovie e reti elettriche, ma l'ecosistema che consente alla democrazia diretta di funzionare. Indebolendolo, "la democrazia non si spegne di colpo: semplicemente, comincia a votare al buio".

IT
29 November 2024

Swiss Sanctions as an Economic Weapon Against Russia: A Legal, Technological, and Historical Analysis

Sanzioni come arma economica: la lezione di Giuseppe Motta a un secolo di distanza Una sintesi storica e istituzionale in vista del voto sulla neutralità del 27 settembre 2026 Il 26 settembre 1921, alla tribuna dell'Assemblea della Società delle Nazioni a Ginevra, il consigliere federale ticinese Giuseppe Motta pronunciò uno dei discorsi più lucidi mai dedicati a quella che allora si chiamava «l'arme économique»: la sanzione economica come strumento di pressione tra Stati. Un secolo dopo, mentre la Svizzera applica il più esteso regime sanzionatorio della sua storia contro la Russia e si prepara a votare, il 27 settembre 2026, sull'iniziativa per una neutralità «permanente e armata», quel discorso torna a essere sorprendentemente attuale. È il filo conduttore di un recente studio giuridico e storico del 29 dicembre 2024, che si può ripercorrere per votare con più consapevolezza. Il regime sanzionatorio svizzero, oggi Dal 4 marzo 2022 la Svizzera applica contro la Russia un pacchetto di sanzioni recepito quasi integralmente da quello dell'Unione Europea, tramite l'Ordinanza sulla situazione in Ucraina (OUcr). La base giuridica non è una legge discussa in Parlamento, ma un'ordinanza del Consiglio federale fondata sull'articolo 184 capoverso 3 della Costituzione federale e sulla Legge sugli embarghi del 2002. Secondo i dati della Segreteria di Stato dell'economia (SECO) riportati nello studio, a fine 2024 risultavano sanzionate oltre 3'200 persone fisiche e giuridiche russe. Lo studio si sofferma su un caso concreto che tocca da vicino la professione notarile: il divieto di fornire «consulenza giuridica» a entità russe, introdotto con l'ottavo pacchetto di sanzioni UE, aveva sollevato il dubbio se includesse anche l'autenticazione notarile di un atto. La Corte di giustizia dell'Unione europea ha chiarito, con sentenza del 5 settembre 2024, che il notaio esercita una funzione pubblica imparziale — non una rappresentanza di parte — e che l'autenticazione resta lecita (CGUE, causa C-109/23). Il punto critico sollevato dall'autore è che questa interpretazione non risulta mai stata comunicata in modo sistematico al mercato notarile svizzero, un silenzio istituzionale che rischia di apparire come una presa di posizione implicita in una materia dove la Svizzera dovrebbe invece proiettare imparzialità. Il precedente di Ginevra: i sette principi di Motta È qui che lo studio si volge alla storia. Nel suo discorso del 1921, Motta enunciò una serie di principi che avrebbero dovuto governare il ricorso all'arma economica nell'ambito del Patto della Società delle Nazioni: gli Stati hanno un dovere morale, non un obbligo automatico, di applicare sanzioni contro chi viola il Patto, restando giudici sovrani della propria decisione; le sanzioni sono legittime solo se le condizioni dell'articolo 16 del Patto sono pienamente realizzate; violare il Patto costituisce un atto ostile verso tutti i membri, ma questo non obbliga gli altri Stati a dichiarare guerra; il blocco economico opera da Stato a Stato, senza penetrare all'interno dei singoli territori; i legami umanitari e diplomatici devono comunque sopravvivere al blocco. Il settimo principio, quello che Motta considerava decisivo, è l'universalità: un blocco economico privo della partecipazione delle grandi potenze — Motta citava esplicitamente gli Stati Uniti, mai entrati nella Società delle Nazioni — perde gran parte della sua efficacia, colpendo i civili senza realmente costringere i governi responsabili a cambiare rotta (discorso riprodotto in Testimonia Temporum, Istituto Editoriale Ticinese, 1931). Il primo vero banco di prova di questi principi arrivò pochi anni dopo, con l'aggressione italiana all'Etiopia nel 1935. La Società delle Nazioni deliberò sanzioni contro Roma — ribattezzate dalla propaganda fascista «inique sanzioni» — ma la Svizzera scelse un'adesione parziale e prudente: mantenne alcune forniture strategiche verso l'Italia, limitò l'impatto sulla propria economia e preservò i canali umanitari e diplomatici, bilanciando l'obbligo di solidarietà internazionale con la propria neutralità permanente (Wikipedia, Sanzioni economiche all'Italia fascista). È una traiettoria che si ripete: la Società delle Nazioni si sciolse nel 1946 e la Svizzera restò fuori dalle Nazioni Unite per oltre mezzo secolo, aderendovi solo nel 2002 dopo un referendum popolare (54,6% dei voti favorevoli) accompagnato da una Dichiarazione di Neutralità Permanente — sì alle sanzioni economiche decise dall'ONU, no a missioni militari coercitive. Perché conta per il voto del 27 settembre 2026 L'iniziativa propone di sancire nella Costituzione una neutralità «permanente e armata», vietando l'adesione ad alleanze militari (salvo aggressione diretta) e il ricorso a misure coercitive non militari verso Stati belligeranti — con un'eccezione esplicita per le sanzioni decise dall'ONU e le misure anti-elusione. È difficile non vedere, in questa formulazione, un'eco quasi letterale del settimo principio di Motta: vincolare la Svizzera alle sole sanzioni realmente universali, quelle con mandato delle Nazioni Unite, respingendo l'allineamento automatico a regimi sanzionatori regionali — come quello UE/G7 attuale, dal quale restano fuori Cina, India e gran parte del cosiddetto Sud globale. Lo studio non si limita a rilevare questa continuità storica: la usa per criticare la modalità con cui la Svizzera ha adottato le sanzioni attuali. A differenza della legge COVID-19, che fu formalizzata dal Parlamento e confermata da un referendum popolare nel giugno 2021, il regime sanzionatorio contro la Russia poggia interamente su ordinanze del Consiglio federale, senza un dibattito legislativo paragonabile. È un argomento istituzionale — sulla forma, non necessariamente sul merito — che ha una sua autonomia rispetto all'esito del voto di settembre. Una lettura equilibrata Va detto con altrettanta chiarezza che il parallelo storico non risolve da solo la domanda referendaria. Il Consiglio federale difende la prassi attuale proprio in nome della flessibilità: una regola costituzionale rigida, sostiene l'esecutivo, toglierebbe alla Svizzera margine di manovra diplomatico. L'iniziativa, inoltre, introduce un elemento assente nel modello di Motta — l'eccezione per l'autodifesa in caso di aggressione preparatoria, che apre a una lettura meno pacifista di quanto il termine «neutralità armata» lasci intendere. E ciò che ha funzionato — o non ha funzionato — nel sistema multipolare degli anni Venti non garantisce risultati identici nel contesto geopolitico odierno, assai più frammentato. Resta però un dato difficile da contestare: la tensione tra universalità e selettività delle sanzioni non è un'invenzione del dibattito politico contemporaneo, ma una questione che la diplomazia svizzera — attraverso la voce di un ministro ticinese — aveva già inquadrato con precisione un secolo fa. Conoscere quella storia non dice a nessuno come votare il 27 settembre, ma permette di misurare quanto la posta in gioco affondi le radici in una tradizione istituzionale ben più lunga della crisi ucraina.

IT
3 March 2024

Reflections on the Macro-Micro Relationship: From Switzerland—Wars, the Environment, and CO2

Guerre, ambiente e CO2 Nota di accompagnamento e aggiornamento all'articolo di Niccolò Salvioni (Locarno, 3 marzo 2024) — Ticinus, agosto 2026 Contesto storico al momento della stesura (marzo 2024) L'articolo originale fu scritto da Niccolò Salvioni il 3 marzo 2024, in un momento in cui la crisi del Mar Rosso era ancora agli esordi. Gli attacchi missilistici e con droni degli Houthi yemeniti contro il naviglio commerciale erano iniziati nel novembre 2023, in solidarietà dichiarata con Gaza dopo l'escalation del conflitto israelo-palestinese avviata il 7 ottobre 2023, e si erano intensificati nei mesi successivi al punto da spingere i principali vettori marittimi (Maersk, MSC, CMA CGM, Evergreen) e compagnie energetiche come BP ed Equinor a sospendere o deviare il transito attraverso lo stretto di Bab-el-Mandeb e il Canale di Suez. In quello stesso periodo era in corso anche l'operazione militare statunitense-britannica "Poseidon Archer" contro le postazioni Houthi (dal gennaio 2024). L'articolo si colloca dunque a ridosso dell'inizio della crisi, quando le stime sui suoi effetti ambientali e climatici erano ancora preliminari; la guerra russo-ucraina era già al suo terzo anno, mentre la crisi dello Stretto di Hormuz, richiamata più avanti in questa nota, sarebbe esplosa solo due anni dopo, nel febbraio 2026. Questa nota di accompagnamento colloca quindi l'analisi originale nel suo momento storico e ne aggiorna gli sviluppi successivi. Indice 1. Premessa editoriale – perché un analista politico istituzionale si occupa di guerra e clima; l'approccio "macro-micro" dalla Svizzera. 2. Il caso di studio: Yemen e Mar Rosso – deviazione delle rotte, aumento del consumo di carburante, stima di ~31,2 Mt di CO2 aggiuntive/anno. 3. Precedenti storici del nesso guerra-CO2. 4. La dimensione strutturale: il "carbon footprint" militare globale. 5. Micro vs macro: il paradosso delle scelte individuali. 6. Diritto internazionale, diritti umani e giustizia climatica – ENMOD, Protocollo I, ecocidio. 7. Filosofia della crisi: "apocalisse climatica" e "apocalisse di guerra". 8. Il possibile ruolo della Svizzera neutrale – mediazione, hub finanziario, diplomazia climatica. 9. Conclusioni e domande aperte, con l'aggravamento Hormuz/Iran come verifica empirica della tesi. 1. Premessa editoriale L'articolo di Niccolò Salvioni, pubblicato su Ticinus nel marzo 2024, propone una riflessione che parte da un caso circoscritto — il conflitto yemenita e le sue ripercussioni sul traffico marittimo nel Mar Rosso — per risalire a una domanda di portata generale: quale incidenza hanno i conflitti armati sull'apporto globale di CO2, e quale responsabilità può assumersi uno Stato neutrale come la Svizzera in questo intreccio tra sicurezza, commercio e clima? Questa nota accompagna la pubblicazione dell'articolo con una contestualizzazione storica dei precedenti guerra-clima, una stima aggiornata della dimensione strutturale del "carbon footprint" militare globale, un aggiornamento sul dibattito giuridico sull'ecocidio e un'osservazione conclusiva sull'aggravarsi della crisi dei colli di bottiglia marittimi, con il caso più recente dello Stretto di Hormuz. 2. Il caso di studio: Yemen e Mar Rosso L'articolo originale stima che la deviazione di circa 9.500 navi all'anno dal Canale di Suez verso il Capo di Buona Speranza, a causa degli attacchi Houthi nel Mar Rosso, comporti un consumo aggiuntivo di carburante di circa 9,9 milioni di tonnellate annue, equivalenti a circa 31,2 milioni di tonnellate di CO2 aggiuntive — una cifra superiore al consumo annuo di derivati del petrolio dell'intera Svizzera (8 milioni di tonnellate nel 2022). Questo calcolo, per quanto volutamente approssimativo, coglie un punto analiticamente solido: gli effetti climatici indiretti dei conflitti, legati alla logistica e non al combattimento in sé, possono superare per magnitudine gli effetti diretti delle operazioni militari. 3. Precedenti storici del nesso guerra-CO2 L'intuizione dell'articolo trova conferma in precedenti storici ben documentati. Guerra del Golfo, 1991. L'incendio doloso di oltre 600 pozzi petroliferi kuwaitiani da parte delle forze irachene in ritirata produsse tra 130 e 140 milioni di tonnellate di CO2, pari a circa l'1,5-2% delle emissioni globali annue da combustibili fossili di quell'anno — un episodio spesso citato come primo caso di "ecocidio" bellico su scala industriale. Guerra Russia-Ucraina, dal 2022. Le stime del consorzio guidato dal Ministero ucraino dell'Ambiente collocano le emissioni dirette dei primi sette mesi di conflitto attorno a 100 MtCO2e; valutazioni successive, che includono incendi forestali (circa un quarto del totale) e le perdite di metano dai gasdotti Nord Stream danneggiati, arrivano fino a 150-175 MtCO2e annui, con la ricostruzione post-bellica destinata a pesare fino al 50% del totale cumulato nei prossimi anni. Questo permette di collocare il caso Yemen dell'articolo (31 Mt/anno) in una scala comparativa: meno del Golfo 1991, ma dello stesso ordine di grandezza della sola componente "carburanti e munizioni" del conflitto ucraino, a conferma che anche conflitti "periferici" e indiretti (blocco di uno stretto, non un teatro di battaglia diretto) generano impatti climatici comparabili a guerre convenzionali di grande intensità. 4. La dimensione strutturale: il carbon footprint militare globale Al di là dei singoli conflitti, la letteratura più recente permette una stima sistemica. Il Conflict and Environment Observatory (CEOBS), in collaborazione con Scientists for Global , stima che il settore militare mondiale (spese operative dirette più filiera industriale-logistica) sia responsabile di circa 2.750 MtCO2e l'anno, pari al 5,5% delle emissioni serra globali — se gli eserciti del mondo fossero uno Stato, sarebbero il quarto emettitore mondiale, dopo Cina, USA e India. Di questa quota, circa 500 MtCO2e (1% globale) deriva dalle sole emissioni operative dirette (carburanti per mezzi e armamenti); il resto proviene dalla produzione industriale bellica e dalle basi. Un limite strutturale rilevante, che l'articolo Ticinus tocca solo indirettamente: nessuno Stato è obbligato a riportare le emissioni militari all'UNFCCC, per cui i dati ufficiali restano frammentari o assenti — una lacuna di trasparenza che una Svizzera depositaria del diritto umanitario potrebbe contribuire a colmare proponendo standard internazionali di rendicontazione. 5. Micro vs macro: il paradosso delle scelte individuali L'articolo originale sviluppa con efficacia il confronto tra l'impatto marginale delle scelte individuali sostenibili (camminare o pedalare per recarsi al lavoro, con un risparmio stimato di appena 70 tonnellate di petrolio a livello planetario se il 30% della popolazione mondiale adottasse questa pratica) e l'impatto di 9,9 milioni di tonnellate determinato dalla sola deviazione delle rotte nel Mar Rosso. La sproporzione — di quasi sei ordini di grandezza — non svaluta l'azione individuale, ma impone di riconoscere che la governance dei grandi sistemi di trasporto e sicurezza resta il livello decisivo su cui intervenire per una reale mitigazione climatica. 6. Diritto internazionale, diritti umani e giustizia climatica L'articolo richiama la Convenzione ENMOD e il Protocollo I aggiuntivo alle Convenzioni di Ginevra, che vietano metodi di guerra intesi a causare danni ambientali estesi, duraturi e gravi, segnalando che l'ecocidio non è ancora un reato internazionale codificato. Da allora il dossier si è mosso concretamente e merita un aggiornamento. Il 9 settembre 2024 Vanuatu, Figi e Samoa hanno presentato formalmente al Gruppo di Lavoro sugli Emendamenti dell'Assemblea degli Stati Parte della Corte Penale Internazionale una proposta di emendamento allo Statuto di Roma per introdurre l'ecocidio come quinto crimine internazionale, tramite un nuovo Articolo 8 ter, definendolo come "atti illegali o arbitrari commessi con la consapevolezza di una sostanziale probabilità di causare un danno grave e diffuso o duraturo all'ambiente". La proposta è stata co-sponsorizzata dalla Repubblica Democratica del Congo e sostenuta da una risoluzione dell'IUCN nel 2025; nel frattempo la Scozia ha presentato un proprio disegno di legge nazionale sull'ecocidio, segno di un movimento che procede anche a livello di singoli Stati mentre l'emendamento internazionale resta bloccato dalla complessa procedura di ratifica dello Statuto di Roma. Nel dicembre 2025 la Procura della CPI ha comunque adottato una "Policy on Addressing Environmental Damage Through the Rome Statute", un quadro operativo che permette di perseguire il danno ambientale grave nell'ambito dei crimini già esistenti (crimini di guerra, crimini contro l'umanità), senza attendere la formale creazione del quinto crimine. Questo aggiornamento rafforza l'argomento dell'articolo: anche in assenza di un reato di ecocidio pienamente codificato, gli strumenti giuridici per collegare distruzione ambientale bellica e responsabilità penale internazionale si stanno consolidando — un terreno su cui la diplomazia svizzera, forte della sua tradizione di depositaria del diritto umanitario e di sede di numerosi fori multilaterali a Ginevra, potrebbe esercitare un'influenza costruttiva. 7. Filosofia della crisi: apocalisse climatica e apocalisse di guerra La sezione filosofica dell'articolo originale, che intreccia etica ambientale, antropocentrismo/ecocentrismo e teoria critica, resta pienamente valida e viene qui confermata senza modifiche: la crisi climatica e la crisi bellica pongono entrambe interrogativi sulla responsabilità intergenerazionale e sui limiti del modello di crescita illimitata. 8. Il possibile ruolo della Svizzera neutrale L'articolo propone un ruolo della Svizzera come catalizzatore di soluzioni pacifiche e sostenibili, sfruttando la sua neutralità storica, l'apertura commerciale e la funzione di hub finanziario e diplomatico. Questa nota conferma la validità dell'impianto, sottolineando che l'urgenza di tale ruolo è cresciuta, non diminuita, alla luce degli sviluppi più recenti descritti nella sezione conclusiva. 9. Conclusioni e domande aperte: dopo il Mar Rosso, lo Stretto di Hormuz Quanto ipotizzato nell'articolo originale sul Mar Rosso si è drammaticamente confermato e superato nel 2026. Dopo la crisi Houthi-Mar Rosso (dal novembre 2023), che aveva già fatto crollare il traffico nel Canale di Suez ben al di sotto della quota storica del 12% del traffico marittimo mondiale, con punte di calo del 90% nel trasporto container su quella rotta, la situazione si è ulteriormente acutizzata con la crisi dello Stretto di Hormuz, apertasi il 28 febbraio 2026 a seguito dell'attacco di Israele e Stati Uniti contro l'Iran. Teheran ha risposto dichiarando lo stretto "chiuso" al traffico commerciale non autorizzato: il transito giornaliero, che oscillava normalmente tra 130 e 140 navi, è crollato fino al 94%, con punte di sole 6 navi al giorno registrate ad agosto 2026, e migliaia di petroliere e gasiere bloccate nel Golfo Persico. Negoziati tecnici tra Iran, Oman e Qatar per la creazione di corridoi sicuri sono tuttora in corso, con esiti incerti. Lo Stretto di Hormuz veicola normalmente circa il 20% del petrolio mondiale e un quinto del GNL globale: il suo blocco parziale, protratto per mesi, comporta — secondo la stessa logica di deviazione di rotta illustrata nell'articolo per il caso yemenita — un aumento drastico delle distanze percorse, tempi di attesa prolungati e un incremento dei premi assicurativi fino a 4-6 volte i livelli ordinari, con un conseguente aumento del consumo di carburante e delle emissioni di CO2 associate al trasporto marittimo ed energetico globale, che si somma e potenzialmente supera l'impatto già calcolato per il Mar Rosso. Il caso Hormuz dimostra empiricamente, a distanza di pochi mesi dalla stesura dell'articolo, che i conflitti nei "colli di bottiglia" marittimi globali — Bab-el-Mandeb ieri, Hormuz oggi — non sono episodi isolati ma un pattern geopolitico ricorrente, con un conto climatico cumulativo crescente. Questo aggrava ulteriormente l'urgenza dell'appello dell'articolo per un ruolo attivo della diplomazia svizzera nella mediazione e nella promozione di una giustizia climatica strutturalmente legata al diritto dei conflitti armati. Restano aperte, per il dibattito pubblico ticinese e federale, alcune domande: la Svizzera dispone ancora della credibilità e delle capacità diplomatiche per offrire i propri buoni uffici in crisi di questa portata? È ipotizzabile un meccanismo di rendicontazione internazionale delle emissioni militari e da deviazione logistica bellica, promosso da Ginevra? E infine: può la nozione di ecocidio, ancora in gestazione giuridica, essere applicata retroattivamente a episodi come Hormuz e Mar Rosso, o resterà uno strumento simbolico più che operativo? Fonti principali utilizzate per l'aggiornamento • IIASA, The Environmental Impacts of the Gulf War 1991 (Linden et al., 2004). • CEOBS / Scientists for Global Responsibility, Estimating the Military's Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions (novembre 2022) e Climate and Militaries Policy Briefing Note 2/25. • Tesi Ambrosi G., Conflitto russo-ucraino: analisi dell'impatto climatico e ambientale, Università di Padova. • Proposta di emendamento allo Statuto di Roma sull'ecocidio, Vanuatu/Figi/Samoa, settembre 2024; Stop Ecocide International, aggiornamenti 2025. • Corriere della Sera, Euronews, Il Giornale, ANSA/Adnkronos, Il Fatto Quotidiano, CdT — cronache sulla crisi dello Stretto di Hormuz, febbraio–agosto 2026. • Coface, Analisi sugli attacchi Houthi nel Mar Rosso e impatto sul commercio marittimo. A cura di Ticinus — nota redazionale di accompagnamento, agosto 202

IT
8 May 2022

Sanctions by Swiss federal Department of Economic Affairs, and Freezing and Restitution of Illicit Assets held by Foreign Politically Exposed Persons by the Department of Justice and Department of Foreign affairs

Switzerland’s Dual-Track Response to Illicit Wealth and Sanctioned States Switzerland manages sanctions and illicit-asset recovery through two distinct legal channels, reflecting its layered federal architecture. Trade and financial sanctions against foreign states, entities and individuals — implementing UN, OSCE or partner-country measures — fall under the Embargo Act (LEmb), enforced by SECO within the Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research. These sanctions freeze funds and economic resources of listed persons and restrict trade in goods, services and capital. A separate instrument, the 2015 Act on the Freezing and Restitution of Illicit Assets of Foreign Politically Exposed Persons (LVP), addresses a narrower but politically sensitive problem: assets held in Switzerland by former foreign heads of state or senior officials suspected of corruption, typically after they lose power in a political upheaval. Here, the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs orders the initial freeze — often within days of a regime change, as with Tunisia’s Ben Ali, Egypt’s Mubarak and Ukraine’s Yanukovych — to preserve assets while the foreign state pursues mutual legal assistance proceedings. If that state’s judicial system is too weakened to complete the process, the Federal Department of Finance can petition the Federal Administrative Court for outright confiscation, relying on a legal presumption that unexplained, disproportionate wealth accumulated during a corrupt regime is of illicit origin. Recovered funds are channelled back not to the state’s treasury directly, but into public-interest programmes benefiting the population, with FDFA supervision. The distinction matters: sanctions under LEmb are a foreign-policy and trade-control tool tied to international coordination, while the LVP mechanism is a targeted anti-corruption and asset-recovery procedure specific to Swiss financial-centre integrity, sitting at the intersection of foreign policy, criminal law and international assistance.

IT DE FREN
24 April 2022

Neutralità svizzera e sanzioni

NEUTRALITÀ SVIZZERA E SANZIONI Sintesi del documento di Niccolò Salvioni del 24 aprile 2022 · Edizione Ticinus, 11 agosto 2026 OGGETTO Il 28 febbraio 2022, quattro giorni dopo l’invasione russa dell’Ucraina, il Consiglio federale decise a sorpresa di riprendere le sanzioni economiche dell’Unione europea contro la Russia. Il documento — introduzione e conclusioni di uno studio di 33 pagine — è la prima presa di posizione pubblica dell’autore sul tema e chiede se quella scelta sia compatibile con la neutralità perpetua svizzera. TESI CENTRALE La ripresa delle sanzioni UE — e non di misure ONU, precluse dal veto russo — configura, secondo l’autore, un’adesione unilaterale che tratta in modo impari i due belligeranti e svilisce il ruolo della neutralità, subordinandola all’allineamento con Bruxelles. LE QUATTRO DIMENSIONI COLPITE ● Politica — offuscamento della capacità di autodeterminazione della Svizzera come Stato neutrale sovrano. ● Armata — esposizione della sicurezza nazionale verso una superpotenza nucleare con cui la Svizzera non può competere; il principio di parità di trattamento tra belligeranti andrebbe applicato in modo estensivo. ● Economica — disaccoppiamento repentino dalla Russia senza uno analogo verso l’Ucraina; rottura della «corrente normale degli affari» con entrambi i belligeranti. ● Attiva — indebolimento del ruolo di Potenza protettrice e mediatrice, e della credibilità delle istituzioni umanitarie con sede in Svizzera, a partire dal CICR. ANCORAGGI GIURIDICI ● Art. 1 LEmb: consente sanzioni su base ONU o dei principali partner commerciali (UE); il veto russo all’ONU rende inoperante la via multilaterale. ● Art. 185 cpv. 1 Cost.: affida al Consiglio federale i provvedimenti a tutela della neutralità — qui, secondo l’autore, non rispettato nel principio di parità. ● Art. 33 Conv. Ginevra: le misure di massa (SWIFT, soglia 100 000 fr.) sfiorano il divieto di pene collettive. IL DATO CHE HA RETTO La stima di ~7,5 miliardi di franchi di beni russi bloccati indicata nell’aprile 2022 è rimasta nello stesso ordine di grandezza: alla fine di marzo 2025 la SECO contava 7,4 miliardi di averi privati bloccati e circa 7,45 miliardi di riserve della banca centrale russa immobilizzate. La previsione dell’autore — una lunga «contesa giudiziaria planetaria» sui beni — resta aperta. PERCHÉ RILEVA OGGI La domanda del 2022 — se la Svizzera sappia ritrovare l’equilibrio tra politica estera e neutralità — è la stessa che gli elettori affrontano nella votazione federale del 27 settembre 2026. Questo testo è il punto di partenza della linea di ricerca Ticinus sul tema.

IT
2 March 2022

Switzerland and neutrality towards belligerents - a system of conflict limitation

March 2022: the first crack in Swiss neutrality Summary and historical context of the article “Switzerland and neutrality towards belligerents: a system of conflict limitation” by Niccolò Salvioni, published on LinkedIn and Academia.edu on 2 March 2022 The context: two days after the turning point in Bern This article – the first in a series of reflections on neutrality that the author has been developing for years – was written in the heat of the moment, just two days after an event which, with the benefit of hindsight, can now be seen as a watershed in contemporary Swiss foreign policy. On Monday 28 February 2022, four days after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Federal Council announced at an extraordinary press conference that it was adopting the economic sanctions against Russia already decided by the European Union, freezing the assets of Putin, Lavrov, Mishustin and all members of the Duma who had voted to recognise the separatist regions of Ukraine. The President of the Swiss Confederation, Ignazio Cassis, declared that “playing the aggressor’s game is not compatible with our neutrality” – a statement which, on its own, overturns two centuries of the doctrine of equidistance. On the same day, the National Council passed a resolution condemning the war: for the first time, the executive and legislative branches simultaneously sided with one belligerent against the other. The Russian daily *Novaya Gazeta* dryly commented that “Switzerland has, for the first time since 1815, violated the neutrality it maintained even during the First and Second World Wars”. These were days when everything was still in flux: Moscow had not reacted officially, Lavrov was unable to reach Geneva due to closed airspace, and China – as Salvioni himself notes – offered its mediation at precisely that time, as if to step into a role that Switzerland was leaving vacant. The content: a question that remains open The text analyses the decision in the light of classical doctrine: Swiss permanent neutrality – recognised by the Congress of Vienna and the Treaty of Paris of 1815, and still enshrined today in Articles 183 and 185 of the Federal Constitution – imposes a duty of non-participation and impartiality towards all belligerents; not an obligation of schematic equidistance, but a prohibition on unjustified discriminatory treatment. Citing the classical definition by Vitzthum and Proelss, the author points out that the regime of rights and duties of neutral states is ‘an important instrument for limiting conflicts’: by distinguishing between neutral states and belligerent states, international law prevents the conflict from spreading. The central question of the paper – “Is the position adopted by the Federal Council and the National Council compatible with Switzerland’s status of perpetual neutrality?” – is deliberately left without a definitive answer. The text observes that the decision, whilst taken in good faith and with humanitarian aims towards Ukraine, has in fact precluded Switzerland from playing the role of an impartial mediator between the parties, further alienating Russia not only from Bern but from Europe itself. Only the future, he writes, will tell whether Switzerland will continue to be regarded as perpetually neutral. Looking back: a prediction that came true More than four years on, this first piece reads like the opening act of an argumentative framework that the author would go on to develop in dozens of subsequent articles. On 25 April 2022 – less than two months later – the author published a second in-depth analysis (“Swiss neutrality and sanctions”), which put the value of assets already frozen at 7.5 billion francs and formalised the argument that the principle of ‘courant normal’ had been violated. From there, the scope of the argument gradually broadened: Switzerland’s accession to the European Sky Shield Initiative in October 2024, its participation in the Council of Europe’s Special Tribunal on the Russian Aggression, the freezing of over 13 billion francs’ worth of Russian assets, right up to the National Council’s declaration of 6 March 2025 on an “independent European security policy” and a constitutional referendum now scheduled for 27 September 2026 on the “Safeguarding Swiss Neutrality” initiative. Even the latest chapter in this escalation – the 39 per cent US tariffs imposed on Switzerland in August 2025, higher than those applied to the EU and NATO – confirms, according to the author, that neutral autonomy, far from being protected, is now perceived by the major powers as an anomaly to be corrected. Rereading this text from 2 March 2022 therefore means returning to the exact moment when the question ‘Is Switzerland still neutral?’ began to be raised with institutional urgency – a question that the forthcoming referendum on 27 September 2026 may well be called upon to settle.

IT DE FREN